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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. ("U.C.A.") Section 78-2a-3 (2) (b) (i)
(1953), as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error by

determining that the court could review a decision of the
Summit County Board of Adjustment (the "Board") "de novo,"
giving no deference to the Board's decision?
Standard of Review:

This Court reviews a trial court's

decisions on the interpretation of law for correctness.
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Park Citv
Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah
1993); Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 800
(Utah App. 1992).
II.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error by

determining on summary judgment that the Snyderville Basin
Development Code did not require Red Barn's Timberwolf Lodge
project, a permitted use within the Resort Commercial Zone
District, to submit to the formal site plan approval process
as a prerequisite to obtaining a Building Permit?
Standard of Review:

The determination of this issue is a

question of law in which the trial court's decision is given
no deference, but in which the County's Board of Adjustment
1

decision that an approved Final Site Plan for the Red Barn
Timberwolf Lodge project is a prerequisite for a Building
Permit is afforded considerable deference and a statutory
presumption of validity.

This Court reviews decisions of a

board of adjustment to determine whether the decision was
arbitrary, capricious or illegal and based upon substantial
evidence in the administrative record.

U.C.A. 17-27-708(2)

& (6); U.C.A. 17-27-1001(3); Patterson v. Utah County Board
of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 603 - 04, 607-08 (Utah App.
1995).
III.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error by

determining on summary judgment that a "permitted use
building permit" under the Snyderville Basin Development
Code (the "Code") does not require site plan approval when
such a "permitted use building permit" does not exist
anywhere in the Code?
Standard of Review:

This Court reviews a trial court's

interpretations of local ordinances and decisions on summary
judgment for correctness.
1367 (Utah App. 1994);

Webb v. Ninow, 883 P.2d 1365,

Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836

P.2d 797, 800 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
936 (Utah 1994).

2

These issues were preserved before the trial court in the
County's initial Memorandum of Points and Authorities, which is
inclusive of the Administrative Record (R. 41-336; 338-60), Reply
to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. 391-400), and in both oral arguments before the
trial court (R. 422; 426), as well as in the court's express
rulings, reflected by Order, dated October 17, 1997, and Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, dated October 29, 1997.
(R. 423-25; 427-30).
However, this Court has stated in Patterson that it will
"review the Board's decision as if the appeal had come directly
from the agency."

893 P.2d at 603.

Consequently, a full review

of the Board of Adjustment's decision and record is preserved as
a matter of law for review by this Court.

(R. 41-336).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1. The County Land Use Development and
Management Act, Utah Code Ann. 17-27-701 708 & 1001 (1953), as amended. (Addendum A ) .
2. The Snyderville Basin Development Code,
Sections 2 (definitions), 3.6, 4.6, 4.12, &
6.14.
(Addendum B ) .
3. The Snyderville Basin Administrative
Guidelines, Resolution 93-1, Sections 7.2 &
12.2.1.
(Addendum B ) .
4. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Addendum D ) .

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a land use case in which a property owner, Red Barn
Development ("Red Barn"), the appellee, challenged Summit
County's interpretation of its own Development Code requiring
Final Site Plan approval of Red Barn's Timberwolf Lodge project
prior to issuance of a Building Permit.

The claim arose from the

Summit County Director of Community Development's (the
"Director's") attempt to enforce the permitting requirements of
the Snyderville Basin Development Code (the "Code") precluding
Red Barn from pulling Building Permits without Final Site Plan
approval by the County.

The Summit County Board of Adjustment

(the "Board") upheld the Director's interpretation of the Code
and Red Barn appealed the Board's decision to the Third District
Court of Summit County.
The trial court's decision in this matter was rendered in
the context of a petition for judicial review pursuant to U.C.A.
Sections 17-27-708 and 17-27-1001.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Red
Barn and the County has appealed.

This Court reviews the issues

asserted herein as though the appeal came directly from the Board
of Adjustment decision.

The same issues as presented to the

Board and trial court, therefore, are presented for this Court's
review.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because inquiry into the specific facts presented by the Red
Barn circumstance was not required for the County's
interpretation of the Snyderville Basin Development Code (the
"Code"), which is the County's zoning ordinance for the
Snyderville Basin, the issues in this case are questions of law
and statutory construction related to (1) the Summit County
Director of Community Development's (the "Director's")
interpretation of the Code, (2) the decision by the Summit County
Board of Adjustment (the "Board") upholding that interpretation,
and (3) the trial court's decision to give no deference to those
interpretations and review the Code "de novo."

Therefore, by its

very nature, the Statements of Facts to be offered by both
parties differ somewhat in character from those which the Court
might normally review in a typical case resolved on cross motions
for summary judgment.
While the parties may argue that the Court should draw
different inferences from the facts presented, there are no
genuine issues of fact which are material to the questions of law
on which the trial court based its decision.

Summary judgment

is, therefore, an appropriate method of resolving the dispute;
limiting the issues before this Court to whether the trial court
(1) used the correct standard of legal review, and (2) reached
the correct legal conclusions.
5

1.

On September 4, 1996, Summit County Senior Planner, Leslie

Burns, acknowledged receipt of a sketch plan for Red Barn's
Timberwolf Lodge project (R. 480) and indicated to Red Barn that
[p]rior to Summit County accepting, reviewing
and issuing Building Permits for the Red Barn
development, Red Barn must first obtain site
plan/subdivision plat approval for the
project. This review procedure is outlined
in the Snyderville Basin Development Code and
includes a Sketch Plan submittal reviewed by
Staff, a preliminary submittal reviewed by
Staff, Service Providers, the Planning
Commission and Board of County Commissioners,
and a final submittal reviewed by Staff,
Service Providers and the Board of County
Commissioners. Two public hearings are
required at the preliminary stage, one with
the Planning Commission and the other with
the Board of County Commissioners.
(R. 256-57; 331-32) .
2.

On March 21, 1997, Red Barn, without having first submitted a

Preliminary Site Plan application, submitted a Final Site Plan
application to the Summit County Department of Community
Development.

Summit County (the "County") refused to officially

accept this application as one for Final Site Plan approval
because Red Barn failed to follow the site plan approval process
requiring sketch plan and preliminary site plan review prior to
final site plan review.
3.

(R. 259-60; 329-30).

On April 11, 1997, Red Barn, without any official approval

from Summit County, declared its Final Site Plan approved and

6

requested a Building Permit to begin construction of its
Timberwolf Lodge project.
4.

(R. 261; 328).

On April 15, 1997, Doug Dotson, Summit County Director of

Community Development, responded to Red Barn's request by denying
issuance of a Building Permit.

In his denial letter, Mr. Dotson

explained that, in accordance with the Snyderville Basin
Development Code, the process for approval of projects, such as
Red Barn's, requires Preliminary and Final Site Plan approval by
the Snyderville Basin Planning Commission and Board of County
Commissioners.

Mr. Dotson explained where in the Code these

requirements were found.
5.

(R. 262-63; 326-27).

On April 24, 1997, Red Barn appealed the Director's Building

Permit denial to the Summit County Board of Adjustment on the
following basis:
Specifically, Red Barn will request that the
Summit County Board of Adjustment determine
that no preliminary site plan approval is
required, that no site plan approval is
required before the Planning Commission, and
that building permits should be immediately
issued based upon the application and
requested permitted use of Red Barn
Development.
(R. 264-65; 324-25).
6.

On May 22, 1997 and June 19, 1997, the Board heard and

weighed the evidence presented by both the Director and Red Barn
concerning Red Barn's appeal of the Director's denial of a

7

Building Permit.

The full administrative record, to include the

decision and findings of the Board, is at R. 41-336.
7.

The question at issue before the Board was whether the

Snyderville Basin Development Code required Red Barn's Timberwolf
Lodge project to go through a site plan approval process.

Red

Barn asserted before the Board that the Code either did not
require a site plan approval of a permitted use or, at a minimum,
was too ambiguous to tell what the site plan requirements were
for a permitted use project and, therefore, should have been read
not to require site plan approval for Red Barn's Timberwolf
Lodge.

(R. 286-89; 296-303; 321-22).

Conversely, the Director

asserted before the Board that the Code was not ambiguous at all
and that, read as a whole, the Code clearly requires site plan
approval for Red Barn's lodge project.

(R. 268-77; 279; 28 9-292;

320-21; 304-314).
8.

The Board, at both of its hearings, devoted considerable time

to the consideration and evaluation of the merits of the appeal.1
The Board heard a staff report from Kevin Deis, a County planner,
and argument from Red Barn.

A number of individuals representing

Red Barn testified and a written statement from the Director was
presented to the Board by Mr. Deis.

1

There was also one member of

Reflected by 24 pages of minutes and 17 Exhibits in the
form of Codes, Briefs, Statements, and Documents. (R. 41-336).
8

the general public who testified that Red Barn's proposed site
plan was inaccurate.
9.

(R. 268-292; 297-323).

Among the most determinative evidence presented to the Board

was the Director's June 19, 1997 Memorandum, which discussed the
Code's site plan requirements.

(R. 304-14).

The Board also

considered as relevant the comments of Board Member Perry, who
sat on the Summit County Commission at the time of the Code's
adoption.

He stated that the clear intent of the Commission was

for the Code to require site plan approval, even for projects
such as Red Barn's.

(R. 315-18).

Especially compelling was the

admission of Red Barn's own architect who testified
Practically, in order to get a building
permit, we have to prepare a site plan. All
of the objective standards are the water,
fire, all of those things, have to be
reviewed in the building permit process. So,
don't split hairs. That's all I'm saying.
Don't split hairs to death about does the
site plan need to be done, because clearly,
they get done and they get approved and they
have all of the information that we would
have otherwise.
(R. 287-88) .
10.

The Board decided 4-1 to uphold the Director's decision and

made findings to substantiate its position.

More specifically,

the Board held as follows:
Board Member Shapiro made a motion that the Board of
Adjustment uphold the decision to deny the issuance of
a building permit to Red Barn Development, L.C., until
the project is reviewed and approved under the site

9

plan review process as outlined in the Development
Code.
Utilizing the Staff's letter of June 19, 1997, which
outlines many of the sections, I would like to go
through some of the highlights of that, and I would
like to incorporate the letter of June 19, 1997, into
our findings:
1.

Section 3.6(a)(1) reads that, even in the
permitted use, there must be all required
permits obtained, including at a minimum a
development permit. A development permit is
required here, and an approved final site
plan must go through formal approval through
the Board of County Commissioners. This is
based upon the fact that the Code is
consistent throughout where it requires a
development permit and a final site plan
approval. There may be some ambiguities with
respect to that requirement, but the
development permit process throughout is a
consistent theme in the Code.

2.

I also do disagree with Mr. Poole when he
said that the project's architect who, when I
asked a question, I remember distinctly said
that a site plan was required, and I do think
that he is allowed to testify here, and I
think his testimony is very relevant here
when he stated that a site plan was required.
He is the architect for the project.

3.

Under Section 6.14 an aipproved final site
plan is required. A final site plan as
determined under the Code says that a map of
a proposed development should be filed after
approval by the Board of County
Commissioners. This piroject falls within the
final site plan approval process.

4.

While there has been extensive discussions
concerning definitions under the Code and
discussions as to whether the Code is
ambiguous or not, both sides agree that the
case of Patterson vs. Utah County Board of
Adjustment states that where there is an
10

ambiguity or uncertainty in a portion of the
statute, it is proper to look to an entire
act in order to discern its intent and
meaning, which means all of the sections that
we've looked at tonight. Even assuming that
the Code is reasonably susceptible to
different interpretations, after reviewing
the arguments presented by Mr. Poole, the
general purpose of the Code is that a
development of this scale and magnitude is
required to go through full site plan
approval by the planning and County
Commissions.
5.

For the reasons presented by Staff in its
June 19, 1997, letter, we adopt Staff's
letter as part of our findings.

The motion was seconded by Board Member Scopes. . . .
The motion passed 4 to 1, with Board Members Perry,
Scopes, Shapiro, and Weller voting in favor of the
motion, Board Member DeGray voting against the motion,
and Board Member Blazzard abstaining from the vote.
. 52-54; 315-17; Addendum B ) .
The Director's memorandum, which was incorporated by
ference into the Board's findings (Finding #5), states in
levant part:
Analysis Related to Site Plan Approval by the County
Commissioners
The Applicant contends that, since the proposed use is
permitted in the Resort Commercial zone, it is entitled
to a building permit without final site plan review by
the Planning Commission and final site plan approval by
the BCC. With regard to the Applicants position the
Department finds the following regulations in the
Development Code:
1.

Chapter 3, Section 3.6(a)(1) requires a
permitted use obtain a development permit

11

prior to establishing a use.
3.6 (a) (1) reads:

Section

. • . No permitted
use shall be
established
until all
required
permits
are obtained including,
at
a minimum, a development
permit.
It is clear in Section 3.6(a)(1) that the
Applicant must obtain a development permit to
proceed with its project.

[A] development permit can be one of many
types of permits or approvals listed in
Section 2.2(43), including a building permit
or a final site plan approval.
Chapter 4, Section 4.12(b) of the Development
Code and Section 12.2(1) of the
Administrative Guidelines elaborates and, in
fact, establishes the specific requirements
for obtaining a building permit. Section
4.12(b) reads:
Building Permit Required - Any
applicant for a building permit

shall submit an approved

final

site

plan,
final subdivision plat, and,
if applicable, a conditional use
permit, master preliminary plat,
specific plan or development
agreement prior to obtaining
issuance of a building permit.

Section 12.2(1) reads:
Development permit required. Any
application for a building permit
shall submit a minor permit or an
approved final site plan , final
subdivision plat, and if
applicable, a conditional use
permit, master preliminary plat,
12

specific plan or development
agreement prior to the issuance of
a building permit.
5.

The minutes of the May 22, 1997 Board of
Adjustment meeting indicate that the
Applicant agreed that a site plan was
required. Richard Kohler, architect for the
Applicant, stated that all information for
site plan review was submitted to Summit
County for review and consideration in
conjunction with the issuance of a building
permit. The Applicant clearly stated that
the issue was not whether a site plan
approval was required, but who was
responsible for reviewing and approving the
site plan for a permitted use. The Applicant
contends that the Community Development
Director can approve the final site plan in
conjunction with the issuance of a building
permit. However, the Development Code does
not permit the Director to approve a final
site plan. Section 2.2 (48) . . . Section
2.2.(9) . . . Sections 4.6(c)(1)(a) and
4.6(c) (2) (a) of the Code.

7.

When reviewed in this context, the
Department's position o[n] Section 6.14 of
the Development Code is correct. Section
6.14 states:

(1) The Director may authorize
building permits for nonresidential and multi-family
dwellings provided that a final
site
plan has been approved by the
County and construction plans have
been released by the County
Engineer. (Emphasis added)
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Analysis Related to Review Process for Site Plan
Approval
Once the Applicant develops a site plan in accordance
with Section 2.2(98), it must seek approval of the site
plan. Chapter 4, entitled "Development Application
Procedures and Approval Processes/' and Section 7.2 of
the Administrative Guidelines, approved by the Board of
County Commissioners on January 12, 1993, describe in
detail the site plan review and approval process.

4.

In accordance with Sections 4.6(b),
4.6(c)(2)(a) of the Development Code and
7.2(2) of the Administrative Guidelines, the
applicant seeks approval of their site plan
and final site plan through the
recommendation from Planning Commission to
the BCC. The process which the applicant is
being required to follow has been the same
process by which the Department has been
reviewing similar development projects in the
Snyderville Basin since the adoption of the
Development Code in 1993. The Department has
consistently brought development projects,
which are permitted uses in their respective
zones, before the Planning Commission and the
BCC for preliminary site plan and final site
plan approval prior to the issuance of
building permits.

Conclusion
Based upon the above analysis of the Development Code
and Administrative Guidelines, it is clear that there
is a logical and understandable process with specific
requirements the applicant needs to follow [sic] in
order to obtain issuance of a building permit.
Moreover, the same review and approval process has been
applied to all other permitted uses that have been
approved by Summit County since the adoption of the
Development Code in January of 1993.
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One other point should be made regarding the
Applicant's claim. Many of the so-called permitted
uses identified in the Development Code do create
impacts on surrounding properties. If the approval of
the Applicant's multi-family development were handled
only through a building permit review process, it would
be impossible to determine any applicable and
reasonable concerns from surrounding property owners.
The issuance of a building permit, for example, does
not require a public hearing, giving property owners
the opportunity to voice concerns. . . . The purpose is
. . . to ensure that the use, in this case a multifamily development, minimizes all impacts on
surrounding properties. . . .
I recommend the Board of Adjustment uphold the
decision to deny the issuance of a building permit to
Red Barn Development, L.C. until the project is
reviewed and approved under the site plan review
process as outlined in the Development Code.
(R. 44-51; 307-14; Addendum B ) .
11.

Red Barn appealed the Board's decision to the Third District

Court of Summit County on July 11, 1997 under U.C.A. 17-27-708
and 17-27-1001.

(R. 1-11).

The County answered Red Barn's

Complaint (R. 19-35) and both sides filed Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment.
12.

(R. 36-37; 365-66).

On October 17, 1997, following a September 30, 1997 hearing,

Judge Pat Brian decided what standard of review he would apply to
the Board's decision.

The County asserted that the court's

review was governed by U.C.A. 17-27-708(2) & (6) and 17-271001(3), which defers to the decision of the Board unless that
decision is arbitrary, capricious or illegal and not based upon
substantial evidence in the administrative record.
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(R. 338-60).

Red Barn asserted that the court's review was "de novo."
369-89).

Judge Brian ruled that his review of the Board's

decision would be "de novo."
13.

(R.

(R. 423-25).

On October 29, 1997, following an October 27, 1997 hearing,

Judge Brian granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
denied Plaintiff's relief prayed for, and denied Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

In making such a ruling, Judge

Brian provided the following reasoning:
3. Plaintiff properly seeks a permitted use building
permit, and not a conditional use building permit. The
Code clearly distinguishes between a permitted use
building permit and a conditional use building permit.
However, this Court is not convinced that the Code
clearly sets forth all the requirements for obtaining a
permitted use building permit.
4. A reading of sections 3.6 and 3.7 of the Code
indicate that while a final site plan approval is
required to obtain a conditional use building permit,
the Code makes no such requirement for obtaining a
permitted use building permit.
5. Defendant's assertion the other elements of the
Code taken together, or in the alternative, that the
intent of the Code gives rise to a requiring a final
site plan for a permitted use building permit is
unsupported by the plain language of the Code.
6. Consequently, this Court holds that Plaintiff need
not submit a final Site Plan for the County's review
and has complied with the Code's requirements set forth
to obtain a permitted use building permit.
(R. 429).
14.

The County appealed these decisions of the trial court on

November 17, 1997 to this Court.
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(R. 431-32).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Judicial review of a board of adjustment decision and a
county's application of its own zoning ordinance carries a
statutory presumption of validity and is afforded broad judicial
deference.

The court will not substitute its judgment for that

of the board but will limit its inquiry into whether reasonable
minds could have reached the decision that the board rendered.
The same deference is given to interpretations of the zoning
ordinance by the County's zoning staff.
An interpretation of the Snyderville Basin Development Code
must be conducted by evaluating all of the relevant provisions of
the zoning ordinance and applying them in a manner which is
internally consistent.

Summit County's staff conducted this type

of evaluation and concluded that Red Barn's Timberwolf Lodge,
located within the Resort Commercial Zone District, requires an
approved Final Site Plan prior to issuance of a Building Permit.
This interpretation, which was adopted by the Board of
Adjustment, is reasonable, internally consistent and legally
correct.
It is important to bear in mind in this context that even if
the ordinance in question and information presented during the
administrative process and hearings may have also justified a
contrary result, that does not render the decision arbitrary,
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capricious, or illegal, or otherwise justify the court
substituting its own judgment for that of local decision makers.
The trial court, however, disregarded this statutory
standard of review and instead struck out on its own accord in
interpreting the Code "de novo," paying no deference to the
decision of the Board of Adjustment.

This improper application

of the law was compounded when the trial court failed to follow
the statutory rules of construction, and, in legislating from the
bench two new development permits previously not present in the
Code, found that Red Barn's Timberwolf Lodge did not have to
submit an approved Final Site Plan prior to issuance of a
Building Permit.

This Court, based on a correct application of

the law to the Code and Board's decision, should reach a contrary
conclusion than that of the trial court and reverse the trial
court's decision.
ARGUMENT
I
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY DETERMINING THAT THE COURT COULD
REVIEW A DECISION OF THE SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD
OF ADJUSTMENT (THE "BOARD") "DE NOVO," GIVING
NO DEFERENCE TO THE BOARD'S DECISION?
The trial court determined that it "would review the Board
of Adjustment's decision de novo, giving no deference to the
conclusions of law reached by the Board of Adjustments."
428) .
18

(R.

A.

Statutory Standard of Review.
As a general matter, board of adjustment decisions which

construe zoning regulations are afforded a presumption of
validity.
The administrative construction of the
ordinance is formally respected by the
courts, and the cases suggest that such
administrative interpretation is given at
least a presumption of validity.
3 Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning, 4 ed. (1996) Section
19.12 at 379.

In Utah, board of adjustment decisions are clothed

with a statutory presumption of validity and a court's review of
those decisions is very narrow.
The courts shall:
(a) presume that land use
decisions and regulations are
valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not
the decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal.
U.C.A. 17-27-1001(3).

See also Thurston v. Cache County, 626

P.2d 440, 445 (Utah 1981).

More specifically, the County Land

Use Development and Management Act states:
(2) In the petition, the plaintiff may only
allege that the board of adjustment's
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal. . . .
(5) (a) (i) If there is a record, the
district court's review is limited to the
record provided by the board of adjustment.
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(6) The court shall affirm the decision of
the board of adjustment if the decision is
supported by substantial evidence in the
record. . . .
U.C.A. 17-27-708.

See also Patterson v. Utah County Board of

Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah App. 1995) (court should give
"substantial deference" to board of adjustment decisions).
Unlike other governmental administrative agency decisions
which are governed by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),
decisions of county administrative bodies, such as boards of
adjustment, are not.

U.C.A. 63-46b-2(l)(b).

See also Tolman v.

Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 n.3 (Utah App. 1991);
Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 706-07 (Utah App.
1988).

Instead the Utah State legislature has set forth a

distinct and very limited standard of review for land use
decisions by counties and boards of adjustment, which, unlike the
APA, does not include any "de novo" review.

U.C.A. 17-27-708(2);

17-27-1001(3). Compare U.C.A. 63-46b-16(4)(b).

The Utah Supreme

Court has agreed, by Rule, to this standard (Rule 81(d), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure & Utah Constitution, Article VIII,
Section 4 ) , the which cannot be altered by the whims of a trial
court judge.

West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah

1982) ("A statute should be applied according to its literal
wording . . . We must assume that each term in the statute was
used advisedly by the legislature and that each should be
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interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted
meaning"); Smith v. Schwartz, 60 P. 305, 308 (Utah 1899) (where
the State legislature has provided a standard of review that is
unambiguous, courts should not attempt to modify the standard).
Consequently, the plain language of Utah statutory law
clearly requires that Board decisions, even ones concerning the
interpretation and application of zoning laws, be afforded
"substantial deference" by the district court and judicial review
is therefore limited to determining only whether the decision was
arbitrary, capricious or illegal and based upon substantial
evidence in the administrative record.
Likewise, this Appellate Court reviews a board of adjustment
decision as if the appeal had come directly from the board and
applies the same standard established for the district court's
review.
B.

Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603.

Case law substantiating the Statutory Standard of Review.
When a board of adjustment's decision turns on its

interpretation of its own zoning ordinance, that interpretation
must be upheld unless it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation."

Levy v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 570

A.2d 739, 746 (D.C. App. 1990).
Utah courts have accepted the premise that boards of
adjustment should be given a "comparatively wide latitude of
discretion" and that their decisions should carry a presumption
21

of correctness.

Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604 n.4 (citations

omitted) .
Accordingly, we will not substitute our
judgment on matters of public policy normally
left to the Board's discretion; we will
simply ensure that the Board proceeds within
the limits of fairness and justice and acts
in good faith to achieve permissible ends.
Id. at 604.

See also Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake

City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1984) ("It does not lie within
the prerogative of the . . . court to substitute its judgment for
that of the Board . . . " ) .

"[C]ourts will not consider the

wisdom, necessity or advisability or otherwise interfere with a
zoning determination unless it is shown that there is no
reasonable basis to justify the action taken.11

Sandy City v.

Salt Lake County (Sandy City I), 794 P.2d 482, 485-86, cert.
granted 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1990).
Even at the staff level, administrative interpretations of
zoning ordinances are given considerable deference.

In re

Duncan, 584 A.2d 1140, 1144 (Vt. 1990) ("absent compelling
indication of error," courts will sustain the interpretation of a
zoning ordinance by the zoning board and staff).

See also

Appelbaum v. Deutsche 489 N.E.2d 1275, 1276 (N.Y. 1985)
(interpretation of a zoning ordinance by the administrative
agency responsible for administering and enforcing the ordinance
is entitled to great weight and judicial deference).
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It is axiomatic that a local zoning board is
entrusted with a reasonable measure of
discretion in the interpretation of its own
ordinances and that the judicial function in
reviewing a board's decision is a limited
one. Accordingly, a board's determination
should not be cast aside unless there is a
showing of illegality, arbitrariness, or an
abuse of discretion (citation omitted).
Bockis v. Kavser, 491 N.Y.S.2d 438, 439 (1985).
This philosophy is also consistent with the seminal cases in
Utah on review of an administrative agency's interpretation of
its own regulation.

In Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing

Div.. 814 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah 1991), the Supreme Court has
stated:
A review of our recent cases, however, makes
it clear that it is not the characterization
of an issue as a mixed question of fact and
law or the characterization of the issue as a
question of general law that is dispositive
of the determination of the appropriate level
of judicial review. Rather, what has
developed as the dispositive factor is
whether the agency, by virtue of its
experience or expertise, is in a better
position than the courts to give effect to
the regulatory object to be achieved.
(emphasis added).
Certainly the overwhelming Utah case authority places zoning
boards, to include boards of adjustment, into the category of
entities which are in a better position than the courts to give
effect to "the regulatory object to be achieved."

See Patterson,

893 P.2d at 607-08; Cottonwood Heights Citizen's Association v.
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Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 593 P.2d 138,
140 (Utah 1979) .
Consequently, it is clear that the weight of case authority
supports the statutory standard of "substantial deference."
C.

Red Barn's argument for "de novo" review.
At the trial court, Red Barn relied on principally five Utah

cases which it held stood for the proposition that "de novo"
review by a trial court of board of adjustment decisions was
appropriate.

These cases were Sandy City v. Salt Lake County

(Sandy City II), 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992), Town of Alta v. Ben
Hame Corporation, 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992), Stucker v.
Summit County, 870 P.2d 283 (Utah App. 1994), Beaver County v.
Utah State Tax Commission, 916 P.2d 344 (Utah 1996), and
Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604.

(R. 377-78; 408).

Notwithstanding

Red Barn's interpretation, none of these cases stand for such a
proposition.
Sandy City II did not concern a board of adjustment
decision, nor, for that matter, was it even a zoning case.

Sandy

City II involved annexation laws and the interpretation of the
waiver doctrine.

The board of adjustment and land use statutory

standards of review discussed above were wholly inapplicable to
that case.2

2

Sandy City I, not Sandy City II, was a zoning case.
However, that case adhered to th€> statutory standard of review.
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In Town of Alta, the appellate court was reviewing the
interpretation of a zoning ordinance by a trial court judge.

As

was the case in Sandy City II, Town of Alta did not concern a
decision of a board of adjustment,3

Given the fact that an

appellate court stands in no better position than the trial court
in the interpretation of County zoning laws, it was entirely
appropriate for the Court of Appeals to review the trial judge's
decision "de novo."

However, it is quite another concept to

disregard the statutory standard of review enacted by the State
Legislature where the interpretation being reviewed by the court
is from a board of adjustment or other county zoning authority.
In those cases, the local zoning authority, who is endowed with
specialized knowledge and skill in zoning and land use, does not
stand in the same position as a trial judge, rather those local
zoning authorities are in a much better position to interpret the
local zoning laws.

See generally, Patterson, 893 P.2d at 607-08;

Morton International, Inc., 814 P.2d at 586; Cottonwood Heights
Citizen's Association, 593 P.2d at 140.

3

In fact, the Town of Alta court stated, "there has been
no official interpretation by Salt Lake County which would bind
or influence the court's interpretation of the county
ordinances." 836 P.2d at 800. That cannot be said in the case
sub iudice.
25

Likewise in Stucker, the appellate court was not dealing
with an interpretation coming from a board of adjustment.

In

fact, in that case, there was no administrative record at all
from which a court could conduct a review of the county's land
use decision.
As for Beaver County, that was a tax case governed by the
State Tax Code and the APA, not one involving land use law and
its specific statutory standard of review found in U.C.A. 17-27708 Sc 1001.
Finally, in Patterson, when the Court of Appeals considered
the amount of discretion given to a board of adjustment in
interpreting its own zoning code, that court concluded
[f]rom a practical standpoint, this standard
necessarily leaves substantial discretion to
the Board of Adjustment. Given the Board's
specialized knowledge in zoning matters and
"the importance of professional expertise and
community-wide perspective in zoning matters,
such a grant of discretion makes good sense."
We recognize that the Board is in a much
better position than we are to achieve the
desired goal of proper zoning as determined
by the county commission. . . .
Patterson, 893 P.2d at 607-08.

Consequently, the plain language

of that case does not lend support to Red Barn's proposition for
"de novo" review.
At the Board and trial court, Red Barn also has relied on
Patterson in support of the contention that, because the
interpretation of the Snyderville Basin Development Code by the
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Board was in derogation of Red Barn's property rights, any
question in interpretation must be resolved in its favor.
P.2d at 606.

893

(R. 283; 384). This citation to Patterson is

narrow and taken out of context.

Reviewed in the proper

perspective, the Patterson citation does not support Red Barn's
position, for prior to and following the sentence which Red Barn
quoted in its trial brief, the Patterson court spent four pages
of discussion establishing "substantial deference" as the
appropriate standard for reviewing a board of adjustment
decision.

For example, following Red Barn's quoted sentence, the

court notes that property owners hold their property subject to
the reasonableness of the police power by the legislative body
and that the exercise of that police power in promoting public
health, safety, and welfare, is afforded a presumption of
validity.

Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606-07.

As discussed herein,

using a permitting system, like site plans, to implement zoning
uses is a valid exercise of the police power.
D.

Conclusion.
While the issue before this Court over the Board's site plan

decision is a question of law, the standard for reviewing that
question is not purely a "correction of error" standard.

In view

of the considerable discretion and presumption of validity
afforded the board of adjustment, the standard is more of a
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"reasonableness" standard absent a showing of illegality,

id. at

604.
The trial court erroneously applied the wrong standard of
review to evaluate the Board's decision, jettisoning the
statutory standard found in U.C.A. 17-27-708 & 1001 and replacing
it with a "de novo" review.

It is no secret why neither the

trial court, nor Red Barn, have ever cited to any controlling
legal authority which would have allowed such a review -- there
is none.
As a rule, a court reviewing a local interpretation of a
zoning ordinance should grant considerable deference to the local
interpretation, reversing only if the interpretation is
unreasonable, inconsistent with the ordinance in general, or
clearly erroneous.4

Accordingly, in the case sub iudice, this

Court should reverse the trial court's decision as to the
appropriate standard of review and follow the wise guidance
provided by the Patterson court:
4

See Appelbaum, 489 N.E.2d at 1276 ("great weight and
deference" given to local agency construction of its ordinance);
Levy, 570 A.2d at 746 (interpretation of zoning regulations by
board of adjustment must be sustained unless plainly erroneous);
Duncan, 584 A.2d at 1244 (interpretation upheld absent compelling
indication of error); S&M Investment Co. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 702 F.Supp. 1471, 1473 (E.D. Cal. 1988)
(interpretation must be "reasonable and sensible"); Miller's
Smorgasbord v. Dep't of Transp., 590 A.2d 854, 856 (Pa. 1991)
(local interpretation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the ordinance or enabling statute).
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We must simply determine in light of the
evidence before the Board [of Adjustment],
whether a reasonable mind could reach the
same conclusion as the Board. It is not our
prerogative to weigh the evidence anew.
893 P.2d at 604.
II
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY DETERMINING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT
THE SNYDERVILLE BASIN DEVELOPMENT CODE DID
NOT REQUIRE RED BARN'S TIMBERWOLF LODGE
PROJECT, A PERMITTED USE WITHIN THE RESORT
COMMERCIAL ZONE DISTRICT, TO SUBMIT TO THE
FORMAL SITE PLAN APPROVAL PROCESS AS A
PREREQUISITE TO OBTAINING A BUILDING PERMIT?
The trial court determined that the plain language of the
Snyderville Basin Development Code did not require Red Barn to
obtain a Final Site Plan prior to issuance of a Building Permit.

A.

Rules of Statutory Construction.
The rules of statutory construction are applied in the

context of interpretation of county ordinances.

E.g., Bennion v.

Sundance Dev. Corp., 897 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah App. 1995);
Clatsop County v. Morgan, 526 P.2d 1393, 1395 (Or. 1974).

Five

rules of construction are particularly important in reviewing an
interpretation of an ordinance.
First, the interpretation must be based on the intent of the
legislative body enacting the ordinance.

Patterson, 893 P.2d at

606; Sandy City, 827 P.2d at 222; Clatsop County, 526 P.2d at
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1395.

That intent must be ascertained from the plain language of

the ordinance.
1996).

E.g., Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah

If the intent is not clear from the language used in the

ordinance, the court may find its meaning in the general purpose
of the ordinance.

Town of Alta, 836 P.2d at 801.

Second, the ordinance must be construed as a whole to give
effect to the overall policy or general purpose which it is
intended to promote.
Thus, where there is an ambiguity or
uncertainty in a portion of a statute, it is
proper to look to an entire act in order to
discern its meaning and intent; and if it is
reasonably susceptible of different
interpretations, the one should be chosen
which best harmonizes with its general
purpose.
[citations omitted] Indeed, this
court has previously stated that it will
"divine the meaning of [a provision in] the
county zoning ordinance . . . from the
general purpose of the ordinance."
[citations omitted]
Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606.

See also Warninster Township v.

Kessler, 329 A.2d 316, 318 (Pa. 1974) (Any interpretation of the
ordinance should have as its objective "to construe any given
word or phrase with due regard to its context, and to harmonize,
if possible, the language under consideration with all other
parts of the statute or ordinance"); Gerald v. York, 589 A.2d
1272, 1274 (Me. 1991) (the ordinance should be construed in light
of the objectives intended for the ordinance and its general
structure as a whole); Clatsop County, 526 P.2d at 1395.
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Accord

Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 897 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Utah App.
1995).

"This rule is especially applicable here because we are

interpreting a comprehensive zoning ordinance."

Clatsop County,

526 P.2d at 1395-96.
Third, an interpretation should be avoided if it renders any
part of the ordinance meaningless, superfluous, void or
insignificant.

Terner v. Spyco, Inc., 545 A.2d 192, 197 (N.J.

Super. A.D. 1988); Czaikowski v. Planning and Zoning Bd. of the
Citv of Milford, 540 A.2d 716, 718 (Conn. App. 1988).
Fourth, as well stated by this Court in Bennion,
to resolve conflicts in interpretation of
statutes and ordinances, . . .
'a provision
treating a matter specifically prevails over
an incidental reference made thereto in a
provision treating another issue, not because
one provision has more force than another,
but because the legislative mind is presumed
to have stated its intent when it focused on
that particular issue.'
897 P.2d at 1235.

Consequently, the more specific provisions of

the Code control over the more general ones.
Fifth, if a term is not defined in the ordinance, it is
appropriate to rely on the interpretation of that term by the
local zoning officials.

Appelbaum, 489 N.E.2d at 1276.

Even if

a term is ambiguous, the zoning agency's interpretation should
control if it is reasonable and sensible.
604.
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Patterson, 893 P.2d at

B. Where non-residential (e.g.; commercial/ resort commercial or
industrial purposes) and multi-family development is concerned/
the Snyderville Basin Development Code, taken as a whole,
requires a Final Site Plan as a prerequisite for a Building
Permit.
(1)

Site Plans generally.

The famed land use expert, Daniel R. Mandelker, Stamper
Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis, summed up
the purpose of site plans as follows:
Site plan review is a zoning technique that
allows municipalities to exercise control
over the site details of a development. In
the typical site plan review procedure, the
applicant for an amendment, conditional use,
variance or building permit submits a
detailed site plan to the planning
commission, zoning board or administrative
staff. Approval of the site plan is required
before development may proceed. Site plan
review usually applies to nonresidential and
multi-family development on individual lots.
It is a useful supplement to subdivision
controls, which do not usually apply to this
type of development because it does not
require subdivision of land.
Mandelker, Land Use Law 4th ed., Section 6.68, pp. 279-80 (1997).
See also Charter Twp. of Harrison v. Calisi, 329 N.W.2d 488, 491
(Mich. App. 1982) (localities have authority to require and
review site plans); Wesley Investment Company v. County of
Alameda , 198 Cal. Rptr. 872, 873, 875-76 (Cal. App. 1 Dist.
1984) (allowing site development review of a permitted commercial
use); McCrann v. Town Plan. & Zoning Commission, 282 A.2d 900
(Conn. 1971) (noting the use of a site plan for an elderly
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residential project); Sun Oil Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
169 A.2d 294 (Pa. 1961) (noting the use of a site plan for a
commercial service station project).
In the County Land Use Development and Management Act,
U.C.A. 17-27-101 et. seg. (1953 & Supp. 1997), the Utah
legislature set up a series of minimum permitting requirements
for land use development.

Among them are the platting

requirement of residential subdivisions and the requisite for
Building Permits prior to beginning construction.
27-801 & 805; 1002(2) (b).

See U.C.A. 17-

The legislature acknowledged, however,

that these were minimum requirements and clearly stated that
"counties may enact ordinances imposing stricter requirements or
higher standards than are required by this chapter."
27-105.

U.C.A. 17-

This is consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's ruling

in State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980), wherein
the Court held that where not inconsistent with the express
language of a statute, the County may use its police powers to
enact additional laws or regulations which bear upon the health,
safety or general welfare of its residents.

See also U.C.A. 17-

5-263 Sc 17-27-102.
Consequently, Summit County is empowered to set up its own
structure for implementing its zoning uses through various
development permits, including, if it chooses, a site plan review
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process (Final Site Plan) for non-residential (meaning, resort
commercial) and/or multi-family development.
(2)

Summit County Site Plan requirements for Nonresidential (e.g.; commercial, resort commercial or
industrial purposes) and Multi-Family Projects.

The Snyderville Basin Development Code (the "Code"), Section
3.6(a) (1), requires that all permitted uses obtain at a minimum,
a "development permit."

This provision of the Code was amended

in 1994 from its former, 1993 language, which had required a
"building permit" as the minimum permitting requirement.

That

very distinct amendment placed all future applicants, including
Red Barn, on actual notice that more than a mere "building
permit" was required for development of a permitted use.
A development permit is defined in Code Section 2.2(43) to
include both a Preliminary and Final Site Plan.

In fact, there

are a variety of development permits provided for, including
Final Subdivision Plats, Building Permits, Conditional Use
Permits, and any other action of the County having the effect of
permitting the development of land.

This would include Master

Preliminary Plans under Section 4.9, Specific Plans under Section
4.10, and Development Agreements under Section 4.11 of the Code.
It is obvious why Section 3.6(a)(1) of the Code did not take the
time to list all of the various types of development permits
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which may be required under the Code for permitted uses -- there
are a multitude of permits that may be required.
Chapter 4 of the Code discusses development permits
generally.

It is uncontroverted that a Building Permit is

required for Red Barn's project.
27-1002(2)(b).

Code, Section 4.125; U.C.A. 17-

Furthermore, Section 4.12, as well as Section

12.2.1 of the Snyderville Basin Administrative Guidelines (the
"Guidelines"), Resolution 93-1,6 specifically require, for all

5

Section 4.12 reads:

(a)

Applicability. No development shall occur except
pursuant to a validly issued, unexpired and unrevoked
building permit.

(b)

Building permit required. Any applicant for a building
permit shall submit an approved final site plan, final
subdivision plat, and, if applicable, a conditional use
permit, master preliminary plat, specific plan or
development agreement prior to obtaining issuance of a
building permit. The permittee shall proceed only in
accordance with the approved development permit and any
approved conditions, . . .

(emphasis added).

(Addendum B ) .

Section 12.2.1 reads:
Development permit required. Any applicant for a
building permit shall submit a minor permit or an
approved final site plan, final subdivision plat, and,
if applicable, a conditional use permit, master
preliminary plat, specific plan or development
agreement prior to the issuance of a building permit.
The permittee shall proceed only in accordance with the
approved development permit (sic) and any approved
conditions, . . .
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development projects, either an approved Final Site Plan or Final
Subdivision Plat prior to issuance of a Building Permit.

As

these sections point out, there may be other permits which could
also be required prior to issuance of a Building Permit; such as
an additional requirement of a Conditional Use Permit where a
conditional use is involved.

Consequently, notwithstanding the

trial court's conclusion that the requirements of a Building
Permit for a permitted use are unclear (R. 429), no matter the
use (conditional or permitted), an applicant must always have one
or the other of the aforementioned development permits (Site Plan
or Subdivision Plat) prior to applying for a Building Permit.7
A Site Plan, according to Sections 2.2 (48) & (98) and 4.6
of the Code, as well as Section 7.2.2 of the Guidelines, requires
a number of specific drawings and information which are
evaluated, in accordance with the development standards of the
Code (principally Chapter 5), by County Planning Staff who then
take it before the planning commission for Preliminary Site Plan
recommendation and then to the County Commission for its

(emphasis added).

(Addendum B).

7

As is easily ascertained from the plain language of the
Code, the trial court's assertion that there are "conditional use
building permits" and "permitted use building permits" is
erroneous. (R. 429). The trial court's erroneous ruling is
taken up in greater detail in Issue III herein.
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approval.
process.

Various public hearings are required during this
A Final Site Plan is then reviewed by Staff and

approved by the County Commission.
Although Code Section 4.6(a) describes some of the
development projects which are required to obtain site plan
approval, it does not indicate that it is an all inclusive
listing of development projects requiring a Site Plan prior to
issuance of a Building Permit.

Instead, this Code Section is

silent as to any requirement for Final Site Plan approvals for
either non-residential (e.g.; commercial, resort commercial or
industrial purposes) or multi-family projects.
Section 6.14(a) (1), however, clearly states that Building
Permits for non-residential (e.g.; commercial, resort commercial
and industrial purposes) and multi-family dwellings shall not be
issued until a Final Site Plan has been approved by the County.8
There is no distinction in the Code between permitted or
conditional use commercial, resort commercial, industrial or
multi-family developments.

8

Section 6.14(a)(1) reads:

(1)

The Director may authorize building permits for nonresidential and multi-family dwellings provided that a
final site plan has been approved by the County and
construction plans have been released by the County
Engineer.

(emphasis added).

(Addendum B ) .
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C. Application of the Code to the Red Barn Timberwolf Lodge
project using the Rules of Statutory Construction.
Red Barn has indicated that its Timberwolf Lodge, which is
to be located within the Resort Commercial Zone District,
consisting of fifteen (15) lodge type buildings and fifty-seven
(57) units, would be "rented on a nightly or periodic basis."
(R. 10). Consequently, the Timberwolf Lodge appears to have the
qualities of both a resort commercial use (tourist accommodations
type service establishment for overnight lodging) and multifamily use (3.8 units per building).
& (44); 3.1(b)(8).9

See Code, Sections 2.2 (23)

These dual qualities, however, are

immaterial because the rules of statutory construction clearly
indicate that the permitting requirements for a lodge project,
like that contemplated by Red Barn, whether viewed as principally
resort commercial or multi-family in nature, are identical and
require a Final Site Plan prior to issuance of a Building Permit.

9

In its August 27, 1996 letter to the Director, Red Barn
asserted that its intent was to "develop multi-family residential
housing."
(R. 255). Nevertheless, during the Board's hearing,
Red Barn referred to the Timberwolf Lodge as a "resort commercial
use" (R. 289), while planning staff referenced it as "multifamily" (R. 277, 292, 307), although the Director did make
mention of the project as a "commercial lodge." (R. 327). The
Board concluded that all parties were in agreement that it was a
"multi-family, resort commercial, lodge for overnight stay, and
the units will be rented on a nightly basis. It was confirmed
that they could also be used on a long-term rental basis." (R.
282). In sum, the Board acknowledged that the project was both
multi-family and resort commercial.
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First, the plain language of Code Sections 3.6(a)(1), 4.12,
and 6.14(a)(1), and the Guidelines, Section 12.2.1 indicate that
a permitted use non-residential (e.g.; resort commercial) or
multi-family type development requires a Final Site Plan
(development permit) and Building Permit.

The Board of

Adjustment pointed to this plain language in its findings.
53-54; 316-17) .

(R.

See Gohler, 919 P.2d at 562 (legislative intent

ascertained from the plain language of the Code).
Second, throughout the Code, zoning is consistently
implemented through a series of development permits.

In the case

of a permitted use, Section 3.6(a)(1) suggests that there are a
variety of permits which may be required (Final Site Plan, Final
Subdivision Plat, Master Preliminary Plan, Specific Plan, and/or
Development Agreement) ending in a Building Permit under Section
4.12.

In the case of a conditional use, Sections 3.7, 4.6, and

4.12 require a Final Site Plan, Conditional Use Permit, and
Building Permit.

As the Board of Adjustment has stated, "the

development permit process throughout is a consistent theme in
the Code."

(R. 53-54; 316-17).

See Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606

(choose the interpretation which best harmonizes with the general
purpose of the Code).
Third, there is no way to accept the trial court's
conclusion that a lodge project (whether resort commercial or
multi-family in nature), like Red Barn's, does not need formal
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site plan approval, and give meaning and effect to Sections 4.12,
6.14(a)(1), and 12.2.1 of the Code and Guidelines, as well as to
the general purpose of the Code requiring a development permit to
implement zoning.

To read the Code as not requiring a Final Site

Plan for a project, such as Red Barn's, negates the express
requirements of Section 4.12, makes Section 6.14(a)(1) null and
void, and renders the County's zoning and permitting process
"meaningless, superfluous, void and insignificant."
545 A.2d at 197; Czaikgwski, 540 A.2d at 718.

See Terrier,

On the other hand,

one can give meaning and effect to all of the provisions of the
Code where one accepts the County's interpretation.

This is

because Section 4.6(a) of the Code, which discusses site plans
generally, can be read consistently with the other Code sections
since it does not express a limitation on projects requiring site
plan approval.10

See Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606 (read Code as a

whole to give meaning and effect to all provisions); Warninster
Township, 329 A.2d at 318.
Fourth, the most specific section of the Code dealing with
Site Plans and the type of project which Red Barn proposes, as
noted by the Board of Adjustment, is Section 6.14(a)(1), which
expressly requires a Final Site Plan for a "non-residential"

10

Red Barn has argued that a site plan is not required for
its Timberwolf Lodge project because Section 4.6(a) is silent as
to resort commercial and multi-family projects.
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(e.g.; resort commercial purpose) or "multi-family" project.

(R.

53; 316). Since "the legislative mind is presumed to have stated
its intent when it focused on that particular issue," this
specific provision controls over the silence in Code Section
4.6(a).

Bermion, 897 P.2d at 1235.

Consequently, the trial court erred in its interpretation of
the Code, which clearly requires Final Site Plan approval of the
Red Barn Timberwolf Lodge project prior to issuance of Building
Permits.
D. Applying the correct standard of review, this Court should
uphold the Summit County Board of Adjustment's interpretation of
the Code which requires Red Barn to procure a Final Site Plan
approval from Summit County as a prerequisite for issuance of a
Building Permit.
Notwithstanding the trial court's "de novo" interpretation
of the Snyderville Basin Development Code, this Court should
apply the required statutory standard of review under U.C.A. 1727-708(2) 8c (6) and 17-27-1001(3), as noted in Issue I herein,
determining only whether the Board's decision was arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal.
(1)

The Board's decision is neither arbitrary, nor
capricious.

Whether the Board's decision regarding Red Barn's Timberwolf
Lodge project is arbitrary or capricious is determined by whether
there is substantial evidence in the record before the
administrative body making the decision.
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Patterson, 893 P.2d at

604.

See also Ziegler, 2 Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and

Planning, 4 ed., Section 42.07[l][a] (1988); U.C.A. 17-27708(6).1:L

Substantial evidence exists when the amount and nature

of relevant evidence is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to
believe that the decision is supported.

Patterson, 893 P.2d at

604, n. 6; Clements v. Utah State Tax Commission, 893 P.2d 1078,
1081 (Utah App. 1995).
The record in this case contains substantial evidence that
the Board thoughtfully considered the arguments on both sides of
the issue and that it reached a decision, based upon the
application of the facts to the Snyderville Basin Development
Code and Utah state law, that a reasonable person could reach;
namely, that the Red Barn Timberwolf Lodge project, as a
permitted use within the Resort Commercial Zone, is required to
obtain an approved Final Site Plan prior to issuance of a
Building Permit.

(R. 41-54; 268-92; 297-323; see also R. 55-243,

inclusive of the Snyderville Basin Development Code, Ordinance
282, and the Administrative Guidelines).

11

Whether this Court or

Capriciousness, in a legal sense, generally exists when
an entity decides differently in two or more cases on identical
facts. E.g., Ziegler, supra. at Section 42.07[2][b]. Appellee
has made no factual allegations which would support a claim that
the decision being challenged is capricious. However, since Utah
case law appears to treat arbitrary and capricious jointly for
purposes of land use decisions, we will not rely heavily on the
legal distinctions.
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anyone else could have reached a different conclusion is
irrelevant.

See Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1035; Thurston, 626 P.2d at

444-45; Sandy City I, 794 P.2d at 486; Ziegler, supra. at Section
42.07[2][b]; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed. , Vol. 8A,
Section 25.278 (1994).

Because there is substantial evidence in

the record supporting the findings and decision of the Board, as
is set forth in Issue II (A - C) herein, its decision was not, as
a matter of law, arbitrary or capricious.
(2)

The Board's decision is not illegal.

The issue of legality turns on whether there was an express
violation of a statutory provision, local ordinance, or
procedural standard in the decision of the Board to uphold the
Director's Building Permit denial.
The record in this matter provides substantial evidence that
the legal requirements contained within both State law and local
ordinances were met.

The Director was clearly within his legal

authority to deny issuance of the Building Permit where Red Barn
did not have a Final Site Plan approval and was, in fact,
contesting that it even needed one.

The Board's decision to

uphold the Director's denial was, therefore, a reasonable
exercise of its review powers and was not illegal.12

12

Red Barn has made no assertions that the procedural
process used by the Board was in any way unfair or violative of
due process or statutory law.
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Ill
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY DETERMINING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT
A "PERMITTED USE BUILDING PERMIT" UNDER THE
SNYDERVILLE BASIN DEVELOPMENT CODE (THE
"CODE") DOES NOT REQUIRE SITE PLAN APPROVAL
WHEN SUCH A "PERMITTED USE BUILDING PERMIT"
DOES NOT EXIST ANYWHERE IN THE CODE?
The trial court based its decision in this case on the fact
that it was "not convinced that the Code clearly sets forth all
the requirements for obtaining a permitted use building permit."
(R. 429).
The Code discusses a Building Permit in Sections 4.12, 5.17,
and 6.14.

However, nowhere in the Code does it ever discuss,

mention or define a "permitted use building permit."

That term,

as well as the term "conditional use building permit," which the
trial court also used, do not exist.

The trial court erred not

only in manufacturing two development permits which do not exist
in the Snyderville Basin, but compounded the error by suggesting
that the Code clearly distinguishes between these two fictitious
permits.

(R. 429).

Utah courts have long viewed the zoning and police powers as
discretionary legislative functions of local government.

Gayland

v. Salt Lake City, 358 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1961); Phi Kappa Iota
Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 212 P.2d 177, 179, 181-82 (Utah
1949); Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 255 P.2d 723, 724 (Utah
1953).

See also U.C.A. 17-27-101 et. sea.
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The basis for this

philosophy is steeped in the notion of separation of powers.
McQuillin, supra. at Vol. 8A, Section 25.278.

The trial court's

sua sponte amending of the Snyderville Basin Development Code to
include two additional permits is the very type of legislative
meddling frowned upon by the Utah Supreme Court when it directed
that its not
for the courts to intrude into or interfere
with the functions or the policies of other
departments of government. Accordingly,
where the action sought is a matter of
discretion, the court may require the public
body (or public official) to act, but will
not substitute its judgment for that of the
public body, by telling it how it must
decide; and when it has so acted the courts
will not interfere therewith unless the
determination made is in violation of
substantial rights, or is so totally
discordant to reason and justice that its
action must be deemed capricious and
arbitrary.
Wright Development, Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 608 P.2d 232,
233-34 (Utah 1980).

See also Navlor v. Salt Lake City

Corporation, 410 P.2d 764, 765-66 (Utah 1966); Crestview-Holladay
Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah
1976) .
Both conditional and permitted uses must submit to the
requirements of a Building Permit.

Code, Section 4.12.

As noted

in Issue II, the requirements for issuance of a Building Permit
for a permitted use are clearly set out in the Code.
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The fact that the Snyderville Basin Development Code is
voluminous and difficult technical reading are not grounds for
disregarding the express provisions of the Code, nor
manufacturing new requirements because the legislative policy is
too complex.

This is a prime reason why boards of adjustment, as

the Patterson court has stated, are "in a much better position
than we are to achieve the desired goal of proper zoning as
determined by the county commission."

Patterson, 893 P.2d at

608.
CONCLUSION
The only issue which the Court need address and decide is
whether the Summit County Board of Adjustment's interpretation
and application of its Development Code as requiring site plan
approval for Red Barn's proposed Timberwolf Lodge is correct.
The Board of Adjustment decision carries with it a statutory
presumption of validity and considerable judicial deference.
Though the issue presents a question of law, the appropriate
standard is not a correction of error standard, but an evaluation
of reasonableness and whether the decision is arbitrary,
capricious or illegal.
The Director and Board of Adjustment properly analyzed and
applied the provisions of the Snyderville Basin Development Code,
in light of the various provisions providing for site plan
approval of projects prior to issuance of a Building Permit, to
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Red Barn's proposed Timberwolf Lodge.

Their interpretation

requiring site plan approval is reasonable, consistent with other
provisions of the Code and not facially erroneous.
Red Barn has failed to meet its burden of marshalling the
evidence to overcome the deference afforded the County's decision
or to rebut the statutory presumption of validity in favor of the
Board of Adjustment decision.

In fact, Red Barn has altogether

disregarded the statutory standard of review in its entirety.
Thus, Red Barn has failed to demonstrate that the County's
application of its Code is arbitrary, capricious, illegal, or
even unreasonable.

At best, Red Barn has argued at the trial

court that there is an alternative interpretation of the Code
which might also be viewed as reasonable.

As a result, it cannot

be concluded that the County's interpretation is unreasonable,
and, therefore, the trial court's decision granting Red Barn
summary judgment must be reversed, and this Court should grant
judgment in favor of Summit County.
DATED this

\ 7 ^ day of February, 1998.

David L. Thomas
Deputy Summit County Attorney
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
(COUNTY LAND USE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT ACT,
U.C.A. 17-27- 701 - 708 & 1001)
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17-27-701

(a) conforms to all applicable health, safety, and building codes;
(b) is capable of use as a residential facility for handicapped persons
without structural or landscaping alterations that would change the
structure's residential character; and
(c) conforms to the county's criteria, adopted by ordinance, governing
residential facilities for handicapped persons in areas zoned to permit
exclusively single-family dwellings.
(3) A county may, by ordinance, provide that no residential facility for
handicapped persons be established or maintained within three- quarters mile
of another existing residential facility for handicapped persons.
(4) The use granted and permitted by this subsection is nontransferable and
terminates if the structure is devoted to a use other than as a residential
facility for handicapped persons or, if the structure fails to comply with
applicable health, safety, and building codes.
(5) (a) County ordinances shall prohibit discrimination against handicapped persons and against residential facilities for handicapped persons.
(b) The decision of a county regarding the application for a permit by a
residential facility for handicapped persons must be based on legitimate
land use criteria and may not be based on the handicapping conditions of
the facility's residents.
History: C. 1953, 17-27-604, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, $ 85.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235,
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992

PART 7
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
17-27-701.

Board of adjustment — Appointment — Term
— Vacancy*

(1) In order to provide for just and fair treatment in the administration of
local zoning ordinances, and to ensure that substantial justice is done, each
county adopting a zoning ordinance shall appoint a board of adjustment to
exercise the powers and duties provided in this part.
(2) (a) The board of adjustment shall consist of five members and whatever
alternate members t h a t the chief executive officer considers appropriate.
(b) The legislative body shall establish the terms for members of the
board of adjustment by ordinance.
(c) The chief executive officer shall appoint the members and alternate
members with the advice and consent of the legislative body.
(d) The chief executive officer shall appoint members of the first board
of adjustment to terms so t h a t the term of one member expires each year.
(3) (a) No more than two alternate members may sit at any meeting of the
board of adjustment at one time.
(b) The legislative body shall make rules establishing a procedure for
alternate members to serve in the absence of members of the board of
adjustment.
(4) (a) The chief executive may remove any member of the board of
adjustment for cause if written charges are filed against the member with
the chief executive.
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17-27-702

an

NHKS

(h) The chief executive shall provide the member with a public hearing
if he requests one.
(5) (a) The chief executive officer with the advice and consent of the
legislative body shall fill any vacancy
(b) The person appointed shall serve for the unexpired term of the
member or alternate member whose office is vacant.
History: C. 1953, 17-27-701, e n a c t e d by L.
1991, ch. 235, $ 86; 1992, ch. 23, § 37; 1995,
c h . 179, 5 13.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1992 amtnd
ment, effective July 1, 1992, added the u»
designation to Subsection (2)(aj and deleted
"with the advice and consent of the legislative
body" before "considers." added Subsection
(2)(aXn\ substituted "chief executive" for "leg

illative body" three times in Subsection (4), and
deleted commas m three places
The I W)5 amendment, effective May 1, 1995,
deleted 'three to* before "five" in Subsection
( >«ta . deleted former Subsection (2)(a)(ii), relfltmg to changes in the membership of the
board, and made a related redesignation.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235,
^ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992

NOTES TO DECISION'S
Purpose.
Former ^ L7 '27-15, providing for a board o*
adjustment, was designed to assure speedv
appeal to the proper tribunal of the grievance of
a part} adversely affected by a decision of an

administrative agency Its evident purpose was
to a-^ur^ the expeditious and orderly developmem <>\ ,i community Lund v Cottonwood
Meadows Co 15 Utah 2d 305, 392 P.2d 40
< 19b 4'

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 101A C J S Zoning and Land Plan
ntng § 180 et seq

17-27-702. Organization — Procedures.
t 1) The board of adjustment shall(a) organize and elect a chairperson; and
<b) adopt rules that comply with any ordinance adopted by the legislative body.
(2) The board of adjustment shall meet at the call of the chairperson and at
any other times that the board of adjustment determines.
(3) The chairperson, or in the absence of the chairperson, the acting
chairperson, may administer oaths and compel the attendance of witnesses.
(4) iai All meetings of the board of adjustment shall comply with the
requirements of Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings.
(b) The board of adjustment shall:
(i) keep minutes of its proceedings, showing the vote of each
member upon each question, or if absent or failing to vote, indicating
that fact; and
(ii) keep records of its examinations and other official actions.
<e) The board of adjustment may, but is not required to, have its
proceedings contemporaneously transcribed by a court reporter or a tape
recorder.
(d) The board of adjustment shall file its records in the office of the
board of adjustment.
(e) All records in the office of the board of adjustment are public records.
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17-27-703

(5) The concurring vote of at least three members of the board of adjustment
is necessary to reverse any order, requirement, decision, or determination of
any administrative official or agency or to decide in favor of the appellant.
(6) Decisions of the board of adjustment become effective at the meeting in
which the decision is made, un]ess a different time is designated in the board's
rules or at the time the decision is made.
(7) The legislative body may fix per diem compensation for the members of
the board of adjustment, based on necessary and reasonable expenses and on
meetings actually attended.
History: C. 1953,17-27-702, e n a c t e d by L.
1991, c h . 235, § 87; 1992, ch. 23, § 38; 1995,
ch. 179, § 14.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, substituted the
language beginning "shall comply" for "shall be
open to the public" in Subsection <4Ma).

The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995,
rewrote Subsection (5), which formerly specified the concurring vote required for five-member and three-member boards.
Effective D a t e s . — Laws 1991, ch. 235,
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

17-27-703. Powers and duties.
(1) The board of adjustment shall hear and decide:
(a) appeals from zoning decisions applying the zoning ordinance;
(b) special exceptions to the terms of the zoning ordinance; and
(c) variances from the terms of the zoning ordinance.
(2) The board of adjustments may make determinations regarding the
existence, expansion, or modification of nonconforming uses if t h a t authority is
delegated to them by the legislative body.
(3) If authorized by the legislative body, the board of adjustment may
interpret the zoning maps and pass upon disputed questions of lot lines,
district boundary lines, or similar questions as they arise in the administration
of the zoning regulations.
History: C. 1953,17-27-703, e n a c t e d by L.
1991, c h . 235, § 88; 1992, c h . 23, § 39.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, added the language "hear and decide" to the end of the
introductory language in Subsection (1) and

deleted it from (l)(a) through (lXc), added Subsection (2), and redesignated former Subsection
(2) as (3).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235,
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

Appeals from zoning decisions.
Illegal zoning.
Appeals from z o n i n g d e c i s i o n s .
This section places no limitations on the
authority of the board of adjustment to hear
appeals from zoning decisions applying a zoning ordinance; thus, the board had authority to
hear an appeal from the decision of a county
commission applying a zoning ordinance.
Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 267 Utah Adv.

Illegal zoning.
Where a city was claiming only the illegality
of rezoning, not seeking a variance or exception
to circumvent some unjust hardship in application of the rezoning, the board of adjustment
had no authority to hear the city's claims; the
statute limits the powers of the board to hear
only alleged errors in zoning enforcement decisions. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d
212 (Utah 1992) (decided under former § 1727-16).
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17-27-704

17-27-704.

COUNTIES

Appeals.

(1) (a) (i) The applicant or any other person or entity adversely affected by
a decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance may
appeal that decision applying the zoning ordinance by alleging that
there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or determination
made by an official in the administration or interpretation of the
zoning ordinance.
(ii) The legislative body shall enact an ordinance establishing a
reasonable time for appeal to the board of adjustment of decisions
administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance.
(b) Any officer, department, board, or bureau of a county affected by the
grant or refusal of a building permit or by any other decisions of the
administrative officer in the administration or interpretation of the zoning
ordinance may appeal any decision to the board of adjustment.
(2) The person or entity making the appeal has the burden of proving that
an error has been made.
(3) (a) Only decisions applying the ordinance may be appealed to the board
of adjustment.
(b) A person may not appeal, and the board of adjustment may not
consider, any zoning ordinance amendments.
(4) Appeals may not be used to waive or modify the terms or requirements
of the zoning ordinance.
History: C. 1953, 17-27-704, e n a c t e d by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 89; 1992, ch. 23, § 40; 1995,
ch. 179, § 15.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, added the designation (i) to Subsection (1 )(a >, substituted "zoning decision administering or interpreting a
zoning ordinance may appeal that decision" for
"zoning decision may appeal a decision" and
"administration or interpretation" for "administration, interpretation or enforcement";
added Subsection (lHa.-di), in Subsection (l)<b;
substituted "the administrative officer in the

administration or interpretation" for "the zoning administrator in the enforcement and administration"; in Subsection (3)(b) substituted
"any zoning ordinance amendments" for "anylegislative zoning decisions"; and deleted commas.
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995,
deleted "zoning" before "decisions" in Subsections (lKaKii and '3 ia 5 and substituted wboard
of adjustment" for "board" in Subsection
(l'KaKii).
Effective D a t e s . - Laws 1991, ch 235,
§ 110 make- the act effective on July 1, 1992

NOTES TO DECISIONS
AN

Bennion v Sundance Dev Corp., 267 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). ">

\: ^sis

Appeal from decision of county commission.
Appeal to county commission
Appeal from decision of county commission.
The provision of this section referring to the
authority of the board of adjustment to hear
appeals from decisions "made by an official" did
not apply to prevent the board from hearing an
appeal from the decision of a county commission; the applicable provision. § 17-27-703,
places no limitations on the authority of the
board of adjustment to hear appeals from zoning decision applying the zoning ordinance.

Appeal to county c o m m i s s i o n .
The board of adjustments is constituted by
statute a forum for review of all administrative
zoning decisions, but nowhere is it made the
exclusive repository of appellate powers; the
county commission has authority to place the
power to issue special exceptions to general
ordinances in the planning commission, and to
create a right of appeal directly to the county
commission itself Thurston v. Cache County,
626 P.2d 440 'Utah 1981)(decided under former
chapterj.
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17-27-706

17-27-705. Routine and uncontested m a t t e r s .
il) (a) With the consent of the legislative body, the chief executive officer
may appoint an administrative officer to decide routine and uncontested
matters before the board of adjustment.
(b) The board of adjustment shall:
(i) designate which matters may be decided by the administrative
officer; and
(ii) establish guidelines for the administrative officer to comply
with in making decisions.
(2) Any person affected by a decision of the hearing officer may appeal the
decision to the board of adjustment as provided in this part.
History: C. 1953,17-27-705, e n a c t e d by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 90; 1992, c h . 23, § 41.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, rewrote the subject
in Subsection (1), which formerly read "The
chief executive officer, with the consent of the

legislative body"; substituted "administrative
officer" for "hearing officer" in three places; and
made related stylistic changes.
Effective D a t e s . — Laws 1991, ch. 235,
$ 310 make? the act effective on July 1, 1992

17-27-706. Special exceptions.
(1) In enacting the zoning ordinance, the legislative body may:
(a) provide for special exceptions: and
(b) grant jurisdiction to the board of adjustment to hear and decide
some or all special exceptions.
(2) The board of adjustment may hear and decide special exceptions only if
authorized to do so by the zoning ordinance and based only on the standards
contained in the zoning ordinance.
(3) The legislative body may provide t h a t conditional use permits be treated
as special exceptions in the zoning ordinance
History: C. 1953, 17-27-706, e n a c t e d by L.
1991, c h . 235, § 9 1 .

Effective D a t e s . — Laws 1991, ch. 235,
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992

NOTES TO DECISIONS
the public health, safety and welfare" if granting the exception will contribute to the orderly
development of the county as a whole
Patterson v Utah Countv Bd of Adjustment,
893 P2d 602 'Utah Ct App 1995)

ANALYSIS

Applicability.
Grounds.
Power to issue.
Applicability.
The board's decision to grant a special exemption to two couples to build and operate an
airstrip for their private use within a few miles
of a private commercial airport was supported
by substantial evidence; none of the board's
required findings was shown to be arbitrary or
capricious, and the decision violated no provision of Jaw Patterson v. Utah County Bd of
Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App 1995).
Grounds.
A proposed special exception will "promote

P o w e r to i s s u e .
Former section authorized, but did not require, the county commission to invest the
board of adjustment with the power to issue
special exceptions UJ general ordinances; however, county commission had authority to place
the power to issue special exceptions in tin
planning commission, and to create a right of
appeal directly to the county commission itself
Thurston v Cache County, 626 P2d 440 (Utah
198U
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17-27-707

17-27-707.

COUNTIRS

Variances.

(1) Any person or entity desiring a waiver or modification of the requirements of the zoning ordinance as applied to a parcel of property t h a t he owns,
leases, or in which he holds some other beneficial interest may apply to the
board of adjustment for a variance from the terms of the zoning ordinance.
(2) (a) The board of adjustment may grant a variance only if:
(i) literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause an
unreasonable hardship for the applicant that is not necessary to carry
out the general purpose of the zoning ordinance;
(ii) there are special circumstances attached to the property that do
not generally apply to other properties in the same district;
(iii) granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a
substantial property right possessed by other property in the same
district;
(iv) the variance will not substantially affect the general plan and
will not be contrary to the public interest; and
(v) the spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed and substantial
justice done.
(b) (i) In determining whether or not enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause unreasonable hardship under Subsection (2Xa),
the board of adjustment may not find an unreasonable hardship
unless the alleged hardship:
(A) is located on or associated with the property for which the
variance is sought; and
(B) comes from circumstances peculiar to the property, not
from conditions that are general to the neighborhood.
(ii) In determining whether or not enforcement of the zoning
ordinance would cause unreasonable hardship under Subsection
(2)(a), the board of adjustment may not find an unreasonable hardship
if the hardship is self-imposed or economic.
(c) In determining whether or not there are special circumstances
attached to the property under Subsection (2)(a), the board of adjustment
may find that special circumstances exist only if the special circumstances:
(i) relate to the hardship complained of; and
(ii) deprive the property of privileges granted to other properties in
the same district.
(3) The applicant shall bear the burden of proving that all of the conditions
justifying a variance have been met.
(4) Variances run with the land.
(5) The board of adjustment and any other body may not grant use
variances.
(6) In granting a variance, the board of adjustment may impose additional
requirements on the applicant that will:
(a) mitigate any harmful affects of the variance; or
(b) serve the purpose of the standard or requirement t h a t is waived or
modified.
History: C. 1953, 17-27-707, e n a c t e d by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 92; 1992, ch. 23, § 42; 1995,
c h . 179, § 16.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1992 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1992, m Subsection
(2KbKi> substituted "Subsection (2)(aV' for
"Subsection (a)," added the phrase "the alleged
hardship" at the end of the subsection, and
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deleted it from (2KbHiKA) and (2)(b)(i)(B).
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995,
deleted "Except as provided in Subsection (3)"

17-27-708

from the beginning of Subsection (2)(a).
Effective D a t e s . — Laws 1991, ch. 235,
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R, — Construction and application of
statute or ordinance requiring notice as prerequisite to granting variance or exception to zoning requirement, 38 A.L.R.3d 167.

Comprehensive plan, requirement that zoning variances or exceptions be made in accordance with, 40 A.L.R.3d 372.

17-27-708. District court review of board of adjustment
decision,
(1) Any person adversely affected by any decision of a board of adjustment
may petition the district court for a review of the decision.
(2) In the petition, the plaintiff may only allege t h a t the board of adjustment's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
(3) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the board of
adjustment's decision is final.
(4) (a) The board of adjustment shall transmit to the reviewing court the
record of its proceedings including its minutes, findings, orders and, if
available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings.
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of t h a t tape
recording is a true and correct transcript for purposes of this subsection.
(5) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the
record provided by the board of adjustment.
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the
board of adjustment's record unless t h a t evidence was offered to the
board of adjustment and the court determines t h a t it was improperly
excluded by the board of adjustment.
(b; If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence.
(6) The court shall affirm the decision of the board of adjustment if the
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
(7) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the board of
adjustment.
(b) (i) Before filing the petition, the aggrieved party may petition the
board of adjustment to stay its decision.
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the board of adjustment may
order its decision stayed pending district court review if the board of
adjustment finds it to be in the best interest of the county.
(Hi) After the petition is filed the petitioner may seek an injunction
staying the board of adjustment's decision.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 17-27-708, e n a c t e d by L.
1991, c h . 235, § 93.

Effective D a t e s . — Laws 1991, ch 235,
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.
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COUNT! KS
NOTKSTO DECISIONS
A'. \i >SJN

Discretion of board
Cited
...
,.
,,
,
Discretion of board.
™. .
, n i r
it L
A .
The board will be found to have exercised its
discretion within the proper boundaries unless
its decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal
and, further, "ftlhe court shall affirm the sub-

stantial evidence in the record"; together, these
concepts mean that the board's decision can
only be considered arbitrary or capricious if not
supported by substantial evidence Patterson v
I'tah County Bd of Adjustment, 893 P2d 602
J
^
/IT. . , „ 4 K
mnCl
(Utah ( t App 1995)
r r

Cited in Ludlow v Salt Lake County Bd of
Adjustment, 893 P2d 1101 (Utah Ct App
1995»

PART 8
SUBDIVISIONS
17-27-801. Enactment of subdivision ordinance.
The legislative body of any county may enact a subdivision ordinance
requiring that a subdivision plat comply with the provisions of the subdivision
ordinance and be approved as required by this part before:
(1) it may be filed or recorded in the county recorder's office; and
(2) lots may be sold.
History: C. 1953, 17-27-801, e n a c t e d by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 94.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch 235,
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1. 1992

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Failure of Subdivision Control in the Western United States A
Bluepnnt for Local Government Action, 1988
Utah L Rev 569.
Preserving Utah's Open Spaces, 1973 Utah
L Rev 164
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am J u r 2d Dedication
§§ 29 to 33; 83 Am J u r 2d Zoning and Planning § 518 et seq

C.J.S. — 26 C J S. Dedication § 22
A.L.R. — Broker's liability for fraud or misrepresentation concerning development or nondevelopment of nearby property, 71 A L R 4th
511
Kev N u m b e r s . — Dedication ®=> 19(2 >

17-27-802. P r e p a r a t i o n — Adoption.
{D The planning commission shall:
(a) prepare and recommend a proposed subdivision ordinance to the
legislative body that regulates the subdivision of land in the county;
(b) hold a public hearing on the proposed subdivision ordinance before
making its final recommendation to the legislative body; and
(O provide reasonable notice of the public hearing at least 14 days
before the date of the hearing.
(2) The legislative body shall:
(a) hold a public hearing on the proposed subdivision ordinance recommended to it by the planning commission; and
(b) provide reasonable notice of the public hearing at least 14 days
before the date of the hearing.
(3) After the public hearing, the legislative body may:
(a) adopt the subdivision ordinance as proposed;
426

PART 10
APPEALS AND ENFORCEMENT
17-27-1001. Appeals.
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county's land use derisions
made under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of this
chapter until that person has exhausted all administrative remedies.
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of the
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the
district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered.
(3) The courts shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal.
History: C. 1953, 17-27-1001, e n a c t e d by
L. 1991, ch. 235, $ 106; 1996, ch. 79, * 20.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1996 amend-

ment. effective April 29. 1996. Mibstitired "that
pei-on ha- exhausted all" for ' t h e \ ]^A\>O exhaunted their" in Subjection 1 '

CHAPTER 27a
CREATING NEW TOWNSHIPS
[REPEALED]
17-27a-101 to 17-27a-105.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1997, ch. 389, § 57 repeals
^ 17-27a-101 to 17-27a-105, as enacted b\
Lawv 1996. ch. 308, $§ 8 to 12, providing for
election** and petitions for the creation of a

township and a township planning ai d zoning
board, effective May 5. 1997. For related provi^on*, -ee ^ 17-27-200 5 to 17-27-206

CHAPTER 28
FIREMEN'S CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
Section
17-28-5

Appointment of county fire department personnel — Volunteers.

17-28-5. Appointment of county fire d e p a r t m e n t personnel — Volunteers.
(\) (a) Except for the chief and deputy chief of a county fire department, all
firefighter positions in county fire departments shall be filled by persons
appointed from a certified county fire civil service register.
(b) County fire civil service registers for employment and promotion
shall be prepared by the County Fire Civil Service executive director
according to the requirements of this chapter and civil service rules.

ADDENDUM B
(RELEVANT PARTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD,
INCLUSIVE OF THE SNYDERVILLE BASIN DEVELOPMENT
CODE AND ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDELINES)

April 15, 1997
Dennis K. Poole
Dennis K. Poole & Associates, P.C
4543 South 700 East
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
RE:

Red Barn Development
Application for Building Permits

Dear Mr. Poole:
The deputy county attorney, Mr. David Thomas, has forwarded to me your letters of March
21 and April 11 and asked that I respond to your inquiries concerning your client's
application for development and issuance of building permits.
The Snyderville Basin Development Code (the "Code") provides that "[n]o development shall
occur except pursuant to a validly issued, unexpired and unrevoked building permit." Code,
Section 4 12(a) The Code goes on to state that "[a]ny applicant for a building permit shall
submit an approved final site plan, final subdivision plat, . . . prior to obtaining issuance of
a building permit " Code, Section 4.12(b) (emphasis added) This is consistent with Section
5.17 of the Code where it discusses "Building Permits and Codes,'* as well as Sections
2.2(43) & (98), 3 6(a)(1) and 4 1 which discuss the necessity of a development permit, such
as a site plan approval, prior to development
Your client's project for a commercial lodge requires site plan approval. As Section
6 14(a)(1) of the Code plainly states,
The Director may authon/e building permits tor non icsidential and multifamily dwellings provided that a final site plan has been approved by the
County and construction plans have been released by the County Engineei
In order to obtain a final site plan approval, Section 4 6(c) o( the Code requires the filing
and appioval of a preliminary sue plan This process is explained in more detail in Chapter
7 ot the Administrative Guidelines (the "Guidelines"), Summit County Resolution 93 1,
VJIILII was uieorpoiated by leferenuc into the Code Section 4 2(b)(1) Approval ol
pielimmaiy site plans is tluoui'h the Snyderville Basin Planning Commission to the Boaid of
Count) Commissioner Section I 9(a)(4) & (b)92)(e), Guidelines, Chapter 7
(».<

Further, the Director of Community Development retains the option of requiring a sketch
plan for review prior to consideration of any site plan. Code, Sections 2.2(99) & 4.3;
Guidelines, Chapter 6.
Consequently, I have chosen to consider your client's March 21 application as one for
preliminary site plan approval. As such, your request for issuance of building permits is
denied.
Obviously, your letters indicate some confusion over the time table for approvals. The ten
day time period noted in your March 21 letter refers to Sketch Plans, not major development
applications such as your clients. Furthermore, as the time table schedule at Section 4.4.3 of
the Guidelines specifically indicates, "said time limits are directory only and only the
mandatory provisions of state statutes shall govern processing . . . ". Section 4.4.1.2. See
also Guidelines, para. 2. As such, the time table is advisory only. No where in either the
Code or Guidelines is there any provision that failure to comply with the time table results in
automatic development approvals.
If your client disagrees with my decision as to the project, you may appeal my decision to
the Summit County Board of Adjustment in accordance with Section 1.9(e)(2)[a][l] of the
Code and Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-27-704(1). See also Merrihew v. Salt Lake
County Planning and Zoning Commission, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983).
Please inform me, as soon as is practicable, of your client's decision to either appeal my
zoning decision to the Board of Adjustment or to proceed with preliminary site plan
approval. In the event the former is chosen, all processing of the preliminary site plan will
cease until resolution of the dispute.
Sincerely,

iJouAljtihJ
Doug Dotson
Director, Community Development
cc: David Thomas, Deputy County Attorney

(JO
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MINUTES
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
SPECIAL MEETING
THURSDAY/ JUNE 19, 1997
DISTRICT COURTROOM, COUNTY COURTHOUSE
COALVILLE^ UTAH
The Special Meeting of the Summit county Board of Adjustment was
called to order Thursday, June 19, 1997, at 7:05 p.m.
PRESENTS

Jonathan DeGray—chairman, John Blazzard, Ron Perry,
Lannie Scopes, Bruce Shapiro, Jared Weller

STAFF PRESENT; Dave Thomas—Deputy County Attorney, Kevin D e i s County Planner, Karen McLaws—Secretary
REGULAR ITEMS
l•

Appeal of Administrative Decision, Red Barn Development,
Dennis Poole
Chair DeGray reported that John Blazzard and Jared Weller
did not attend the previous meeting where this matter was
discussed, but they have had an opportunity to review all of
the information. Deputy County Attorney Dave Thomas
explained that the By-laws state that, If they have become
familiar with the subject matter by reading all of the
minutes and all the submittals from all of the parties, they
can participate in the process. They must make a
declaration on the record that they have done so, John
Blazzard reported that he had read all the information
provided. He further stated that he wished to step down and
allow Alternate Board Member scopes to vote in his place if
Board Member Perry arrives as Alternate Board Member scopes
attended the previous meeting. Board Member Jared Weller
stated that he had read the information provided.
Chair DeGray read the overview and background submitted by
Staff at the previous meetingPlanner Deis reported that Mr. Poole has submitted his
summary of arguments, and he distributed copies of Staff's
summary of arguments to the Board Members. Mr. Thomas
explained that the Board Members should fully read both
submissions fully before entering into deliberation. The
Board Members read the summations.
1
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Chair DeGray reported that Board Member Fon Perry had
arrived, and Board Member Blazzard has agreed to be present
for the discussion but abstain from voting in order to allow
the alternate, Lannie Scopes, who attended the last meeting,
to vote on the matter.
John Blazzard made a motion that he abstain from voting
so that Lannie Scopes could continue with the
discussion and vote on this issue based on the fact
that he was in attendance at the previous meeting in
which this matter was discussed. Ron Perry seconded
the motion which passed S to 0, with Lannie Scopes, the
alternate member of the Board, abstaining from the
vote.
Board Member Shapiro discussed the building permit process
and the requirement for a site plan and noted that Staff's
presentation indicates that the difference between a singlefamily dwelling obtaining a building permit and a project of
this type is that a single-family dwelling has already gone
through a full plat approval process which requires a site
plan and development approval which eventually goes to the
Board of County Commissioners• He asked for Mr. Poole's
response to that argument. Mr. Poole felt that it applied
to many single-family applications, but not all of them.
Some parcels do not fit a prior approved subdivision, and
they would go through an application process requiring
filing of a subdivision or preliminary plat. He gave an
example of a farmer building a barn not needing a site plan.
Board Member Shapiro noted that appcoval of single-family
dwellings outside subdivisions is handled through a minor
permit process. Planner Deis explained that with a lot
larger than 40 acres, a minor permit is required. A lot
smaller than 40 acres that does not meet the zoning criteria
of the area requires a minor permit and a site plan. He
explained the minor permit review process.
Mr. Poole maintained that the criteria involved in the
conditional use permit process are not necessary for a
permitted use. He felt that the conclusion reached in
requiring that review was based on Chapter 4, and he felt
the language in 5.17 should be relied upon, He did not feel
that Chapter 4 applied to the application because it is not
a subdivision and because it is a permitted use. He took
issue with the statement in the County's submittal that the
applicant conceded that a final plat was necessary. Mr.
Kohler may have said something to that effect, but Mr. Poole
2
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stated that Mr. Kohler was not the spokesperson for Red
Barn. Mr. Poole stated that he was the spokesperson, and he
did not concede that point. He contended that the applicant
is not required to go through a rezone, nor do a
subdivision, nor have a conditional use permit, nor have a
development agreement, nor have a site plan.
Chair DeGray stated that, in reviewing the- Code, he asked
himself where the applicant is directed to submit a site
plan or commence the site plan review process for a
permitted use. It first seemed straightforward that a site
plan was not needed, but the further he read, the murkier
the issue became by the time he read Section 4.12. Planner
Deis explained that Section 4.12 states that an approved
final site plan is required. Chair DeGray felt that, if you
read Chapter 4 and found that your particular development
did not fall within the procedures outlined, you would not
go to Section 4.12 but would go to Chapter 5. Planner Deis
explained that, if there is an ambiguity, it is proper to
look at the entire act to discern its meaning and intent.
If it is reasonably susceptible of different
interpretations, the one should be chosen which best
harmonizes with the general purpose- You would look at the
entire Code, not just one specific statement in the Code.
Mr. Poole noted that there is another rule of reason for
interpreting codes, and typically, the more specific
language controls the more general. If you interpret the
Code to make it harmonize, you cannot exclude Section 5 and
you cannot exclude the language of Section 3.6. That must
be interpreted in the concept of what is a permitted use.
Planner Deis noted that Section 4.12 also indicates that a
building permit is required, and Chapter 5 indicates what is
required to obtain the permit. Chair DeGray asked about
Section 6.14, and Mr. Poole felt that did not apply because
a public improvement required by the plat or site plan was
not involved. Planner Deis explained that, for an applicant
to get from the road to his property, the right-of-way must
be crossed, requiring an encroachment permit, which would be
a public improvement.
Board Member Shapiro stated that everything he saw indicated
that a site plan was required.
Board Member Scopes discussed the fact that August 27 was
the applicant's first correspondence to Director Dotson, and
3
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in that letter the applicant stated what they wanted to do.
Director Dotson's response on September 4 specifically
stated that the applicant was not aware of the process and
that building permits could not be obtained prior to plat
approval. It also stated that the County would not accept
building permit applications for development projects which
did not have approved development permits. On March 21 the
applicant responded that they were submitting final site
plan approval. They then sent another lettez- stating that,
since they had not received a response from Director Dotson,
they assumed that the project was approved- The applicant
then received a letter stating that the project was not
approved and reiterating the Code. The letter of September
4 stated that the applicant must have an approved
development permit, and the last letter stated that they
must have preliminary site plan approval. He questioned
whether the request in the September 4 letter for final site
plan approval was met,
Mr. Poole responded that they did not agree with the process
when they received the September 4 letter. They eLected to
prepare a final site plan approval because they did not want
to leave any question about their compliance with all the
regulations. They did not concede that they had to do it;
they only did it to accommodate the process and get the
application approved. The applicant sent the second letter
shortly thereafter because Section 4.4.3 requires thar. the
Director respond within 10 days. Section 4.4,3 addresses
use by right, which indicates no participation by the
Planning Commission, County Commission, or Board of
Adjustment, and he claimed they were entitled to the us*..
Planner Deis explained that they were moving from the point
where the applicant submitted a sketch plan to a building
permit, and the Staff argues that aLl the other steps ha^e
to be met before you can get to the building permit.
Board Member scopes clarified that the applicant cannot
apply for a building permit until hs> goes through site plan
and final site plan approval by the Planning Commission and
Board of County Commissioners- Planner Deis explained that
the County will not accept building permit applications for
development projects which do not have approved development
permits. An approved development permit includes site plan,
final site plan, preliminary plat, etc.

4
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Chair DeGray felt that the question was whether the Code
enforces the Director's ability to jtake the decision to
require a permitted use to go through the process. He noted
that site plan would be reviewed at Staff level for any
other project for compliance with the Code. They must
decide whether the appropiiate authority is granted for this
particular use not to go through the site planning process*
The question before this body is whether there is a problem
with the Code and whether there is sufficient information in
the Code for a reasonable person to determine what is
required.
Board Member Blazzard asked if the Code states that when
multiple units are placed on a parcel of land it constitutes
a subdivision. Planner Deis explained that, because the
developer would be siting the buildings on the parcel, they
would be subdividing it. Since the code was adopted, other
hotels have been reviewed and required to go to the Planning
Commission and Board of County commissioners.
Vince Desimone, representing Shepherd of the Mountains
Lutheran Church, requested that the public hearing be reopened. He felt the applicant was Inaccurate as to where
buildings would be placed on the site and that the planning
process should be followed so information could be developed
to allow them to take a position as to how this project is
compatible with public interest. H»2 asked that the Board of
Adjustment make a decision that w i n allow the public to
participate in the planning process. He also noted that
this decision would set a precedent for other land in the
Wolf Mountain area.
Board Member Blazzard questioned the rationale that, since
this is a permitted use, the developer could get a building
permit without site plan approval, and he asked who would
determine where the building and the development of the
piece of property would take place* It was noted that it
would go back to Planning Staff for review and there would
be no public review process.
Mr. Poole stated that the only thing staff could interpret
is whether the permitted use complies with the requirements
of the zone. If it goes to the Planning Commission or Board
of County Commissioners, there would be nothing they could
request that the applicant: change. If the criteria are met,
it is not a conditional use, and they could not impose any
other restrictions because they are not provided by Code.
5
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Board Member Shapiro responded that they could impose
conditions on where the parking is located, where the
screening is located, the signage, etc. Planner Deis
explained that all the service providers must also provide
approval. Chair DeGray agreed with Staff that a project of
this size should go through a Planning Commission review
with public input because of its impact.
Board Member Perry expressed concern about receiving
information pertaining to this decision only a few hours
before the meeting. He explained that his intent as a
County Commissioner when the Code was adopted was that the
purpose of permitted uses was to specify areas in the County
for various types of development. it was not intended to
abrogate the process of site approval for density, stream
alteration, ridgeline protection, wetlands, and other
issues. He felt that trying to glean out parts of the Code
to fit a process that the applicant may or may not want to
follow would abrogate the process. He did not feel that the
intent of the County Commission was to avoid a development
processf even in the permitted use.
Board Member Scopes stated that he did not see any ambiguity
in the Code relative to Staff's recommendation.
John Blazzard stated that it appeared that the process had
been conducted this way since 1993, and everyone else who
has been involved in developing was required to go through
the process. It appeared that there had been many people
who had understood the Code and the process, and he was
concerned about circumventing the opportunity for public
input.
Board Member Jared Weller discussed the fact that a
precedent could be set. Precedents have been set at times,
and they have regretted them, and he felt that the process
with the Planning Commission must be followed to make the
process viable for everyone. He felt the planning process
was good for the community.
Board Member Shapiro noted that, consistently throughout the
Ordinance, there are requirements for development permits.
He could not imagine that the County Commission's intent was
that a project of this magnitude would not go through the
formal approval process with the Planning Commission and the
Board of County Commissioners. He felt that
6
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circumnavigating that process would circumnavigate the
intent of the statute as a whole.
Chair DeGray felt there were some problems with the Code
which made it hard to follow and read. He felt that a
project of this magnitude should be reviewed through the
Planning commission level with public input- Looking at
what the Code provides for this project, according to
Sections 3.5 and 3,6, it is a permitted use. He had a
difficult time supporting Staff's request to uphold the
Director's decision because he did not believe the Code was
clear enough. He felt there was enough ambiguity that he
would side with the property owner.
Board Member Perry noted that the staff indicated that there
have been other applicants with permitted uses who have been
through the approval process, but apparently this applicant
disagrees, so he may find ambiguity in the Code. The
applicant has presented some good arguments, but Board
Member Perry felt there was enough evidence in the intent of
the Code and its provisions to uphold staff's position.
Chair DeGray clarified that, even as a permitted use, the
application would go through Staff review which could be a
high level of scrutiny. He questioned whether there was
enough information in the Code to push it to the level of
Planning Commission and Board of County Commissioners
review.
Board Member Shapiro made a motion that the Board of
Adjustment uphold the decision to deny the issuance of
a fcuilding permit to Red Barn Development/ L.C., until
the project is reviewed and approved under the site
plan review process as outlined in the Development
code.
Utilizing the staff's letter of June 19, 1997, which
outlines many of the sections, X would liKe to go
through some of the highlights of that, and I would
like to incorporate the letter of Juno 19, 1997, into
our findings;
1.

Section 3.6(a)(1) reads that, even in the
permitted use, there must be all required permits
obtained, including at a minimum a development
permit* A development permit is required here,
and an approved final site plan must go through
;
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Summit county Board of Adjustment
Special Meeting
June 19, 1997
formal approval through the Board of County
Commissioners. This is based upon the fact that
the Code is consistent throughout where it
requires a development permit and a final site
plan approval. There may be some ambiguities with
respect to that retirement/ but the development
permit process throughout is a consistent theme in
the Code.
2.

I also do disagree with Mr. Poole when he said
that the project's architect who, when I asked a
question, I remember distinctly said that a site
plan was required, and I do think that he is
allowed to testify here, and I think his testimony
is very relevant here when he stated that a site
plan was required* He is the architect for the
project.

3.

Under Section 6.14 an approved final site plan ia
required. A final site plan as determined under
the code says that a map of a proposed development
should be filed after approval by the Board of
County Commissioners. This project falls within
the final site plan approval process.

4*

While there has been extensive discussion
concerning definitions under the Code and
discussions as to whether the Code is ambiguous or
not, both sides agree that the case of Patterson
vs. Utah county Board of Adjustment atatea that
where there is an ambiguity or uncertainty in a
portion of the statute, it is proper to look to an
entire act in order to discern its intent and
meaning, whioh means all of the sections that
we've looked at tonight. Even assuming that the
code is reasonably susceptible to different
interpretations, after reviewing the arguments
presented by Mr. Poole, the general purpose of the
Code is that a development of this scale and
magnitude is required to go through full site plan
approval by the Planning and County Commissions.

5.

For the reasons presented by Staff in its June 19,
1997, letter, we adopt Staff*a letter as part of
our findings.
The motion was seconded by Board Member Scopes.
8

i\

<

»>
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board Member Perry commented that, whatever the decision or
the Board, whether confirming or denying this, it would, of
course, be up to t he appellant to either decide to work with
Staff or to take t his--I guess the next step would be
District Court. J ust as a matter of comment, I would hope
that the Wanning Staff would not be prejudiced because of
this meeting and w ould do whatever is necessary to help the
eipplicant out, as a comment, and not as a mandate, because
we're still in Ame rica and this is a process we're going
through, and I'd 1 ike to see it work. And if they do choose
not to, that the s taff would expedite this as expeditiously
as possible.
Board Member Scopes stated that he agreed completely. I
don't think that anyone here wants to see the project not
fulfilled. Ttfs just that we feel very strongly that the
project needs to go through the proper process•
The motion passed 4 to l, with Board Members Perry,
Scopes, Shapiro, and Weller voting in favor of the
motion, Board Member Dearay voting against the motion,
and Board Member Blaazard abstaining from the vote.
The Special Meeting of the Summit County Board of Adjustment
adjourned at 8:40 p.m.
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June 19, 1997
To:

Summit County Board of Adjustment

From:

Doug Dotson, Director
Department of Community Development

Subject:

Red Barn Development, L.C.
Appeal of Administrative Decision

During the hearing on May 27, 1997, the Board of Adjustment (Board) asked for a summary of the
County's position relative to the above-referenced appeal. The following is a analysis of the
Snyderville Basin Development Code (Development Code) and the Snyderville Basin Development
Code Administrative Guidelines (Administrative Guidelines) through which the Department of
Community Development (Department) determined that the Red Barn, L.C. (Applicant) project is
required to submit a site plan for review by Staff, review by the Snyderville Basin Planning
Commission (Commission) with a recommendation to the Board of County Commissioners, and
approval by the Summit County Board of County Commissioners (BCC).
Given all of the arguments and positions represented by the Applicant, the central issue is as follows:
Can the applicant's project proceed with only the issuance of a building permit
following staff review of a site plan or is the applicant required to submit a site
plan for review and approval by the Planning Commission and BCC before a
building permit can be issued?
Analysis Related to Site Plan Approval by the County Commissioners
The Applicant contends that, since the proposed use is permitted in the Resort Commercial zone, it
is entitled to a building permit without final site plan review by the Planning Commission and final
site plan approval by the BCC. With regard to the Applicants position the Department finds the
following regulations in the Development Code.
1.

Chapter 3, Section 3.6(a)(1) requires a permitted use obtain a development permit prior to
establishing a use. Section 3.6(a)(1) reads:
If the Symbol "P" appears in the cell, the use is permitted subject to the
general requirements for specified uses within the zoning district, this
Chapter and the applicable performance standards set forth in Chapter 5 of
this Code. No permitted use shall be established until all required permits
are obtained including, at a minimum, a development permit. (Emphasis
added to note that the Applicant's argument fails to include this sentence.)
It is clear in Section 3.6(a)(1) that the Applicant must obtain a development permit to
proceed with its project.

The definition of a development permit is contained in Chapter 2, Section 2.2(43). The
definition reads:
Development Permit - any building permit; conditional use permit;
preliminary subdivision plat; final subdivision plat or other plat approval;
preliminary site plan; final site plan; rezoning; or any other official action of
the County or any state or local government commission, board, agency,
department, or official having the effect of permitting the development of
land located within the geographic area subject to the provisions of this Code.
It is clear that if the Applicant pursues the development of its property, it must first obtain
a development permit. Based on this definition, a development permit can be one of many
types of permits or approvals listed in Section 2.2(43), including a building permit or a final
site plan approval.
Chapter 4, Section 4.12(b) of the Development Code and Section 12.2(1) of the
Administrative Guidelines elaborates and, in fact, establishes the specific requirements for
obtaining a building permit. Section 4.12(b) reads:
Building Permit Required - Any applicant for a building permit shall submit
an approved final site plan, final subdivision plat, and, if applicable, a
conditional use permit, master preliminary plat, specific plan or development
agreement prior to obtaining issuance of a building permit. The permittee
shall proceed only in accordance with the approved development permit and
any approved conditions, and shall agree by recorded document to convey no
portion of the parcel without first obtaining final approval in accordance with
the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis added)
Section 12.2(1) reads:
Development permit required. Any application for a building permit
shall submit a minor permit or an approved final site plan , final
subdivision plat, and if applicable , a conditional use permit, master
preliminary plat, specific plan or development agreement prior to the
issuance of a building permit. The permittee shall proceed only in
accordance with the approved development permit and any approved
conditions, and shall agree by recorded document to convey no
portion of the parcel without first obtaining final approval in
accordance with the provisions of the Code.
The requirements of a final site plan are clearly defined in the development code. Section
2.2 (98) states that a site plan shall include the following. This information must be
submitted to Summit County for review purposes.
Site Plan - a development plan of one or more lots on which is shown: (1) the

UvU-

existing and proposed conditions of the lot, including but not limited to
topography, vegetation drainage, floodplain, wetlands and waterways; (2) the
location of all existing and proposed buildings, drives, parking spaces,
walkways, means or ingress and egress, drainage facilities, utility services,
landscaping, structures, signs, lighting, and screening devices; (3) the
location of building pads for residential and non-residential buildings; and (4)
the location and extent of all external buffers from surrounding areas.
The minutes of the May 22,1997 Board of Adjustment meeting indicate that the Applicant
agreed that a site plan was required. Richard Kohler, architect for the Applicant, stated that
all information for site plan review was submitted to Summit County for review and
consideration in conjunction with the issuance of a building permit. The Applicant clearly
stated that the issue was not whether a site plan approval was required, but who was
responsible for reviewing and approving the site plan for a permitted use. The Applicant
contends that the Community Development Director can approve the final site plan in
conjunction with the issuance of a building permit. However, the Development Code does
not permit the Director to approve a final site plan. Section 2.2 (48) clearly states:
Final Site Plan - the map of a proposed development to be file after approval
by the BCC and any accompanying materials as described in this Code.
The BCC is clearly defined in Section 2.2.(9) of the Development Code. It states:
BCC - the Board of County Commissioners of Summit County, Utah.
This is consistent with Sections 4.6(c)(1)(a) and 4.6(c)(2)(a) of the Code
When reviewed in this context, the Department's position of Section 6.14 of the
Development Code is correct. Section 6.14 states:
6.14

Issuance of Building Permits and Certificate of Occupancy
(a)
Except as provided in Section 5.17(d) of this Code, no
building permit shall be issued for a lot or building unless all public
improvements as required for any applicable subdivision plat or site
plan have been completed, or are part of an improvement agreement
as per Section 6.9 of this Code, as attested to by the Director and
County Engineer and all applicable service providers.
(1)
The Director may authorize building permits for nonresidential and multi-family dwellings provided that a final
site plan has been approved by the County and construction
plans have bee released by the County Engineer. (Emphasis
added)
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The Applicant contends that this Section does not preclude the Director from issuing a
building permit without site plan approval by the Board of County Commissioners. The
Applicant states that it interprets the term "approved by the County" to refer to any
authorized official of Summit County, including the Director. However, according to
Sections 2.2(48), 2.2(9), 4.6(c)(1)(a) and 4.6(c)(2)(a) of the Development Code, described
above, the authorized entity of Summit County is clearly defined. It is the Board of County
Commissioners.
Analysis Related to Review Process for Site Plan Approval
Once the Applicant develops a site plan in accordance with Section 2.2(98), it must seek approval
of the site plan. Chapter 4, entitled "Development Application Procedures and Approval Processes,"
and Section 7.2 of the Administrative Guidelines, approved by the Board of County Commissioners
on January 12, 1993, describe in detail the site plan review and approval process. (The purpose of
the Administrative Guidelines as defined in Section 2 of the Guidelines "is to assist County Staff and
applicants in the administration and implementation of the Code".)
1.

With regard to the approval process, Section 4.6(b) of the Development Code describes the
approval procedures and reads:
"Approval Procedures. No site plan shall become effective, nor shall
compliance with the provisions of this Code be determined, until a final site
plan has been approved by the BCC."

2.

Section 4.6(c)(2)(a) of the Development Code describes the effect of a final site plan and
reads:
After a final site plan has been approved by the BCC and filed in the Office
of the Summit County Recorder, and no subdivision plat is required and no
final subdivision plat application is pending, the applicant may apply for
building permits consistent with the proposed site plan. No building permit
application may be filed with the Building Official until the Director has
certified that such application conforms to the approved site plan.

3.

Section 7.2(2) of the Administrative Guidelines under the title "Processing Applications for
Site Plan or Subdivision Plat Approval" reads:
After the completion of a report and recommendation to the [Planning]
Commission, the Director shall schedule a hearing on the application before
the [Planning] Commission. The [Planning] Commission shall conduct the
hearing and submit its recommendation of the BCC. Within five (5) days
after the recommendation of the [Planning] Commission has been rendered,
the Director should place the application and recommendation of the
[Planning] Commission on the next available regular agenda of the BCC.
After receiving the recommendation of the [Planning] Commission, the BCC
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shall consider the application at a public hearing and shall render its decision
to approve, deny or conditionally approve the application. One (1) copy of
the preliminary site plan and subdivision plat shall be returned to the
applicant with the date of approval, conditional approval, or disapproval and
the reasons therefore accompanying the application.
4.

In accordance with Sections 4.6(b), 4.6(c)(2)(a) of the Development Code and 7.2(2) of the
Administrative Guidelines, the applicant seeks approval of their site plan and final site plan
through the recommendation from Planning Commission to the BCC. The process which
the applicant is being required to follow has been the same process by which the Department
has been reviewing similar development projects in the Snyderville Basin since the adoption
of the Development Code in 1993. The Department has consistently brought development
projects, which are permitted uses in their respective zones, before the Planning Commission
and the BCC for preliminary site plan and final site plan approval prior to the issuance of
building permits. Although a member of the Planning Commission, who also represents the
Applicant, testified that the Planning Commission does not review permitted use, this
Planning Commission members statement is incorrect and misleading to the Board of
Adjustment. Exhibits A and B hereto list pending and approved projects that have been or
will be coming before the Planning Commission and the BCC for review and approval.
Each of these projects is a permitted use in the zone district in which it is located.

Analysis Related to Issuance of Building Permits for Single Family Dwellings
The Applicant also contends that the Department's interpretation of the Development Code is
discriminatory because the Department does not require that all building permit applications be
approved by the Board of County Commissioners. The Applicant contends that if Section 4.6
requires a site plan approval for permitted uses; then, it follows that those persons applying for a
building permit for a single family residence would require Board of County Commissioner
approval. The Applicant uses the provision of Section 4.6(b) of the Code that states "no site plan
shall become effective, nor shall compliance with the provisions of this Code be determined, until
a final site plan has been approve by the BCC" as a basis for this argument.
With regard to the Applicants position, the Department finds the following regulations in the
Development Code.
1.

Chapter 3, Section 3.6(a)(1) requires a permitted use, including single family dwelling units
in most zone districts, to obtain a development permit prior to establishing a use. Section
3.6(a)(1) reads:
If the Symbol "P" appears in the cell, the use is permitted subject to the
general requirements for specified uses within the zoning district, this
Chapter and the applicable performance standards set forth in Chapter 5 of
this Code. No permitted use shall be established until all required permits
are obtained including, at a minimum, a development permit. (Emphasis
added to note that the Applicant's argument fails to include this sentence.)
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2.

The definition of a development permit is contained in Chapter 2, Section 2.2(43). The
definition reads:
Development Permit - any building permit; conditional use permit;
preliminary subdivision plat;/ma/ subdivision plat or other plat approval;
preliminary site plan; final site plan; rezoning; or any other official action of
the County or any state or local government commission, board, agency,
department, or official having the effect of permitting the development of
land located within the geographic area subject to the provisions of this Code.

3.

Chapter 4, Section 4.12(b) of the Development Code elaborates and, in fact, establishes the
specific requirements for obtaining a building permit. Section 4.12(b) reads:
Building Permit Required - Any applicant for a building permit shall submit
an approved final site plan, final subdivision plat, and, if applicable, a
conditional use permit, master preliminary plat, specific plan or development
agreement prior to obtaining issuance of a building permit. The permittee
shall proceed only in accordance with the approved development permit and
any approved conditions, and shall agree by recorded document to convey no
portion of the parcel without first obtaining final approval in accordance with
the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis added)

Given this information, it should be pointed out that the vast majority of building permits for single
family dwelling units are issues for lots within approved and platted subdivisions. In other words,
& final subdivision plat, within which a single family dwelling is being considered for building
permit purposes, are all previously approved by the Board of County Commissioners. Therefore,
further review and approval by the Board of County Commissioners is not required.
There are two instances were a single family dwelling may be considered outside of an approved and
platted subdivision, including lots that exceed forty (40) acres in size and on legally created nonconforming parcels. Section 2.2(69) of the Development Code addresses these uses. They are not
required to obtain Board of County Commissioner approval. They can simply obtain a minor permit
from Summit County. The related provision of the Development Code are as follows:
69. Minor Permit - a development permit authorizing any of the following:
69.1

new single lot or single unit residential uses on a parcel greater than forty
(40) acres in a site located outside of a platted or recorded subdivision;

69.6

all single lot or single unit residential uses on existing parcel that would
otherwise be rendered unbuildable pursuant to the density restrictions of
Section 5.13 herein.

These two allowable instances are included in the Development Code to accommodate land owners
whose non-conforming property were in existent prior to the adoption of the Development Code in

1977 and 1992.
Approval of Other Uses
A Planning Commissioner representing the Applicant stated in the May 22, 1997 Board of
Adjustment meeting that other permitted uses have been approved in a manner that did not require
Planning Commission or Board of County Commissioner approval. Reference was made to the
green tennis bubble and ski lifts at Wolf Mountain. It should be noted for the record that the green
tennis bubble is not approved as a permitted use. Rather, Wolf Mountain made application for the
tennis bubble as a temporary use/activity under the Development Code's Minor Permit provision.
As such, it was reviewed through the Minor use provisions of Section 2.2(69.4) of the Development
Code. It is not approved as a permanent facility and must be removed upon expiration of the minor
permit.
The above mentioned ski lifts were approved previously by the Planning Commission and the Board
of County Commissioners as a Class II Development Permit for "Project Ski-91,f under the 1985
Development Code for the Wolf Mountain area. The Minor Permit provision, Section 2.2(69.3), of
the Development Code, authorizes certain uses as long as the project is an amendment to an
approved development permit.
Ambiguity in the Interpretation of the Code
The applicant has argued that based on the reading of Section 3.6(a)(1), the Development Code is
ambiguous and therefore, the Board must liberally construe the code in favor of the property owner.
The applicant's argument is based on the Court of Appeals of Utah, case Patterson v. Utah County.
Board of Adjustment, which defines how an ambiguous code provision should be interpreted. The
court wrote in that case that:
[W]here there is an ambiguity or uncertainty in a portion of a statute, it is proper to
look to an entire act in order to discern its meaning and intent; and if it is reasonably
susceptible of different interpretations, the one should be chosen which best
harmonizes with its general purpose. Indeed, this court will "divine the meaning of
[a provision in] the county zoning ordinance ... from the general purpose of the
ordinance.
If an ambiguity exists, which the Department has clearly argued does not, the court requires that it
is proper to look to the entire act in order to discern its meaning and if the act is still suspect, one
should choose the best act which harmonizes with the acts general purposes. These two test of an
acts' (Code) ambiguity have to be applied before a decision is rendered in favor of the property
owner.
Conclusion
Based upon the above analysis of the Development Code and Administrative Guidelines, it is clear
that there is a logical and understandable process with specific requirements the applicant needs to
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followed in order to obtain issuance of a building permit. Moreover, the same review and approval
process has been applied to all other permitted uses that have been approved by Summit County
since the adoption of the Development Code in January of 1993. Furthermore, it is clear the
Department has been consistent in the enforcement of the Development Code with the issuance of
building permits for single family dwelling units and is not acting in an arbitrary and capricious
manner against the applicant.
The applicant argues that it is not subject to certain Chapters of the Development Code, particularly
Chapter 4, since Section 3.6(a)(1) does not specifically state that permitted uses are subject to
Chapter 4. However, as pointed out above, the Development Code does, in fact, require the
Applicant to submit a final site plan for approval by the Board of County Commissioners before a
building permit will be issued. As a result the Applicant's project is subject to the provisions of
Chapter 4.0. Denial of the issuance of a building permit by the Director is, therefore, authorized
by the Development Code because the applicant does not have a final site plan approved by the
BCC.
Finally, the Applicant argues the Department is acting outside of the development review powers
granted to Summit County by the State Legislature. The U.C.A. 17-27-102 gives counties broad
land use authority (see also Patterson v. Utah County. Board of Adjustment, 893 P2d 602, 606-607
(Utah App. 1995): State v. Hutchison. 624 P2d 1126.1127 (Utah 1980)). Furthermore, U.C.A. 1727-104 allows counties to impose more restrictive standards than the State Legislature would require.
Although a commercial development did not require a subdivision plat under U.C.A. 17-27-804, the
State Statue is silent as to the requirement of site plans, which as noted in our argument, is required
under our Development Code. Clearly, the county has authority to require such an approval process
in its development Code, under State Law. In fact, the state code has been amended as of May 5,
1997, to require commercial development to have a subdivision plat requirement as well.
Subsequently, the Applicant's attack on the Development Code, asserting that its provisions on site
plans are unreasonable, is outside the scope of the Board of Adjustment powers of review. Such an
argument should have been raised in accordance with U.C.A. 17-27-1001 at the time of the
enactment of the Development Code, or as a constitutional substantive due process claim.
One other point should be made regarding the Applicant's claim. Many of the so-called permitted
uses identified in the Development Code do create impacts on surrounding properties. If the
approval of the Applicant's multi-family development were handled only through a building permit
review process, it would be impossible to determine any applicable and reasonable concerns from
surrounding property owners. The issuance of a building permit, for example, does not require a
public hearing, giving property owners the opportunity to voice concerns. The purpose is not to
deny the use at that location. After all, it is a permitted use. The purpose is, however, to ensure that
the use, in this case a multi-family development, minimizes all impacts on surrounding properties.
This, too, is part of the due process entitled to residents of the Snyderville Basin.
I recommend the Board of Adjustment uphold the decision to deny the issuance of a building permit
to Red Barn Development, L.C. until the project is reviewed and approved under the site plan review
process as outlined in the Development Code.
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Exhibit A.
Recently Approved "Permitted Use" Developments

Silver Creek Business Park
Kimball Center
Washington Mutual Bank
Spring Creek Plaza
Smith's Store
Village at Kimball Junction
Storage Units, Silver Creek Industrial Park
First Security Bank
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EXHIBIT B
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SUMMIT COUNTY PUNNING DIVISION
6/9/97
PROJECT/LOCATION

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

Snyderville Basin Planning District
SIZE

GOSHAWK
8
J. GRAHAM, SUBD
LOTS
SILVER CREEK
SILVER SAGE
| 15
J. GRAHAM, SUBD.
LOTS
SILVER CREEK
SPRING CREEK ASSOC.
M.BARNES/J.DOILNEY, SKETCH
BITNER ROAD SWANER
SHADOW MOUNTAIN
9
D. ARMSTRONG. SUBDIVISION
LOTS
OLD RANCH ROAD
WALLIN
J. MCCOMAS, SKETCH PLAN
HWY224
KIMBALL PLAZA
91500
M.MCPHIE, PRELIM
SQ. FT.
KIMBALL JUNCTION
SUMMIT CENTER COMP
M. ALLRED, SKETCH PU\N
RASMUSSEN ROAD
SUMMIT WATER DIST.
J. DESPAIN. SITE PLAN
j
RASMUSSEN ROAD
SILVER SUMMIT
47
T. DIDAS, MAJOR SUBD
LOTS
HWY. 40 SILVER SUMMIT
TIMBERWOLF CONDOS
60
J. FOGG, SKETCH PU\N
ROOM
WOLF MOUNTAIN
AMES, ED
MINOR PERMIT
OLD RANCH ROAD
PARK @ EAST CANYON CREEK
J. GRAHAM.SKETCH PLAN
RASMUSSEN ROAD
DUTCH DRAW
3
C. RIDEOUT, SUBD.
LOTS
WOLF MOUNTAIN
SNYDERVILLE WEST
J. GADDIS, SUBD.
WOLF MOUNTAIN
BROOKSIDE ESTATES
J. GRAHAM.SUBDIVISION
BROOKSIDE ESTATES
I
KILBY SUBD.
R.KARZ, SKETCH PLAN
PINEBROOK
DEER VALLEY
B. WELLS, MINOR PERMIT
DEER VALLEY
PANHANDLE RANCH
3
D.SARGENT, SKETCH PLAN
LOTS
OLD RANCH ROAD

!
i

i

I
I

I

I
i
i
i

i

I

!
)
!

Page 1

Sheetl

|
19

20

21

22

23

24

25

FACTORY STORE EXPANSION
R.EMERY, UNITS 115,117,120
KIMBALL JUNCTION
SWANER MEMORIAL PARK
P. SARGETAKIS. SPA
KIMBALL JUNCTION
MARQUEE RESTAURANT
T. AITKEN, SKETCH PLAN
LANDMARK DRIVE
PARK CITY SKI AREA
STEVE CRANE, MINOR PERMIT
PARK CITY RESORT
MINOR PERMIT
J DOILNEY, MINOR PERMIT
PINEBROOK POINTE
SANDSTONE CREST
BRODSKEY, MICHAEL; SKETCH
SILVER SUMMIT
MINOR PERMIT
IVERS.POLLY MP
WHITE PINE CANYON RD
[

Pa
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Summit County Board of Adjustment
Regular Meeting
May 22, 1997
Shapiro explained that the Code is in place and accessible
to the public. Mr. Davis agreed to provide a topographical
map for review at the next meeting.
Board Member Perry made a motion to table the item to
allow the applicant to demonstrate that there is a
greater hardship than what has been presented and
recommended that Staff, due to the lack of
communication, try to help expedite the process for the
applicant. The motion was seconded by Board Member
Shapiro and passed unanimously, 4 to 0.
3.

Appeal of Administrative Decision, Red Barn Development,
Dennis Poole
Planner Deis presented the staff report and explained that
the applicant is appealing a decision made by Community
Development Director Doug Dotson concerning the processing
requirements for the Snyderville Basin Development Code for
a multi-family, lodge-type development located on Highway
224 near Wolf Mountain. The applicant contends that the
project does not need to be reviewed and approved by the
Planning Commission and the Board of County Commissioners
through the site plan approval process and has requested
that building permits be issued for the immediate
construction of the multi-family units. The applicant bases
this on the fact that the proposed use is a permitted use in

the zone.

Director Dotson denied the request based on

requirements of the Snyderville Basin Development Code that
all projects, whether permitted or conditional uses, must
receive site plan approval from the Planning Commission and
Board of County Commissioners prior to the issuance of any
building permits.
Planner Deis explained that the issue is why the applicant
needs to have a site plan review. The explanation is that
it is one of the requirements of the Code prior to issuance
of a building permit. He explained the site plan review
process using other projects as examples and noted that site
plan review is required because there are always issues on a
site which are critical for the Planning Department to
understand in terms of locating houses, roads,
infrastructure, etc. Projects must be reviewed by 21
service providers who identify important aspects such as
water, public utilities, air quality, wildlife resources,
wildfire hazard, sewer, fire department response time, etc.
Sight distances on roads are reviewed by the County Engineer
3
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Summit County Board of Adjustment
Regular Meeting
May 22, 1997
as well as proper turnaround areas and access into other
lots.
Board Member Shapiro asked if there are any approvals
without going through a site plan approval process in Summit
County. Planner Deis explained that there are approvals
only if a person wants to build one single-family residence
on one lot. Board Member Shapiro asked if there is a
provision in the Code for that. Planner Deis explained that
a single-family residence goes through a building permit
approval process, which has its own criteria.
Planner Deis explained that the Department of Community
Development has used these standards since 1993, and every
subdivision that comes in for approval must meet the same
requirements. This application is not a unique case. He
cited Section 4.1 of the Code which states that no
development may be undertaken within the unincorporated
areas of Snyderville Basin without issuance of the required
development permits in accordance with the Code.
Board Member Shapiro asked for the definition in the Code
that applies to development permits and why single-family
dwellings do not require site approval by the Planning
Commission and Board of County Commissioners. He asked for
the definition of that differentiation. Planner Deis stated
that it would take some time to review the Code to find the
exact reference.
Planner Deis referred to the definition of a development
permit in the Code as provided to the Board Members. A
reasonable person would look at that definition and
determine that they need a development permit and determine
what is required to obtain it. He referred to the
development matrix in Section 3.6 of the Code which outlines
the permitted and conditional uses in each zone. The matrix
explains that use is permitted subject to the general
requirements for specific uses within the zoning district
and refers to the performance standards set forth in Chapter
5* It further states that no permitted use shall be
established until all required permits are obtained, include
at a minimum, development permits. A development permit
requires a site plan, preliminary plan, and final plat.
Board Member Shapiro referred to 6.14(a)(1) which states
that the Director may authorize building permits for nonresidential multi-family dwellings provided that a final
4
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Summit County Board of Adjustment
Regular Meeting
May 22, 1997
site plan has been approved by the County. He felt the
issue was not whether a site plan is required but who makes
the decision on a site plan. He asked if that is the issue
at hand. Planner Deis explained that the issue is whether a
site plan review is required, which does require review by
the Planning Commission and Board of County Commissioners.
Board Member Shapiro asked what the word "County" refers to.
He asked if that term is defined. Planner Deis stated that
he believed the State Statute defines it as the legislative
body, which would be the Planning Commission and Board of
county Commissioners.
Planner Deis referred to Chapter 5 contains the criteria by
which site plans are reviewed. Section 4.12 deals with the
building permit process, which states that no development
shall occur except pursuant to a valid, issued, unexpired
and unrevoked building permit. It further states that all
applicants for a building permit shall submit an approved
final site plan. He noted that, to get to a final site
plan, you have to do either a preliminary plan which is
reviewed and turns into a site plan on multi-family homes or
a preliminary subdivision plat for single-family homes.
Sections 6.14 discusses issuance of building permits and
states that, except as provided in Section 5.17(a), no
building permit shall be issued for a lot or building site
unless all public improvements required for any applicable
subdivision plat or site plan has been completed* A
subdivision plat cannot be reached without a site plan
review. In Section 4.6(c)(1) it states that the preliminary
site plan shall not authorize the development of land.
After the preliminary site plan has been reviewed by the
BCC, the applicant may file for a final site plan. A final
site plan cannot be acquired without a site plan review. He
referred to the Administrative Guidelines, Section 7.1 which
explains that preliminary plan review and site plan review
can be processed concurrently. It is clear that the Code
requires site plan review, and it is consistent throughout
the Code. Planner Deis explained that the standard is that
a reasonable, well informed person can understand what is
required in the Code, and there is no ambiguity about it.
The Code must be looked at as a whole, and it is in place to
ensure that development is done in a very sane and orderly
manner and meets health, safety, and welfare criteria. Staff
recommends, based on the Code sections cited and the
information contained in the staff report, that the Board
make a decision to uphold the Director* s decision to deny
the issuance of building permits for the Red Barn
5
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development project until the project is reviewed and
approved under the site plan approval process as outlined in
the Administrative Guidelines. Without the site plan
review, developments can potentially be constructed with no
regard to site layout, buffering, setbacks, environmental
constraints, infrastructure adequacy, etc. site plan review
and approval ensures that the development complies with the
Code's standards and requirements, and the project does not
become a detriment to the County.
Dennis Poole, attorney for the applicant, stated that the
proposed project is not a subdivision. The Code defines
subdivision as any land which is "divided" or proposed to be
divided or re-subdivided into two or more lots. This is not
proposed to be divided. It is a resort commercial use,
lodge-type, with separate buildings, with one owner, on one
large parcel. He reminded the Board that their job is to
decide what the Code says, not to set policy.
Board Member Shapiro asked when the Administrative
Guidelines were adopted. Planner Deis responded that they
were adopted at approximately the same time as the
Development Code.
Mr. Poole explained that a sketch plan was requested and
submitted to the development department prior to the
application of March 21, 1997. Director Dotson wanted to
treat the application as an application for a preliminary
site plan, but the applicant does not feel they are required
to submit any site plans due to an argument based on a
logical, reasonable reading of the Code, and an argument
related to a requirement of Summit County not to act in an
unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or abusive manner.
Mr. Poole explained that zoning codes are authorized by the
State Legislature, and are usually adopted first by
development of a General Plan, then by enacting a zoning
ordinance to implement the General Plan. The General Plan
anticipates permitted and conditional uses. Permitted uses
are presumed to be permitted without the need for any
special kind of review due to circumstances. He cited
Section 3.5 regarding application of zoning district
regulations. Subparagraph (d) states that uses shall be
limited to those identified in the scheduled uses as a
permitted use or a conditional use. Section 3.6 was
discussed as it pertains to the application, which states
that the application must meet the requirements of this
6
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chapter, not Chapter 4, and the applicable performance
standards in Chapter 5. He referred to the term
"development" and read the definition of "development" from
the Code. He maintained that, according to the definition,
which includes the definition of a conditional use permit to
which the applicant is not subject, the Code is ambiguous.
He stated that, when the Code is ambiguous, it must be
interpreted in favor of the landowner.
Board Member Shapiro asked Mr. Poole to explain the
ambiguity. Mr. Poole explained that the Code states they
are required to obtain a development permit. He questioned
which development permit—one or all of the ones defined.
He asked who gets to decide which one applies,
Mr. Poole referred to 3.6(a)(2) regarding conditional uses
and referring to Section 3.7. Permitted uses do not have a
specific section one can refer to as can be done with
conditional uses. Section 3.7 states that conditional uses
are those which are generally compatible with the uses in
the zoning district, but which, because of their size,
scale, intensity of use, traffic generation, or other
characteristics, require individual review of their
location, design, configuration, and the imposition of
conditions in order to ensure the appropriateness of a use
in a particular location within a given zoning district. It
does not state that individual review is required for a
permitted use. In paragraph 3.7(b) regarding conditional
uses, it states "site plan required." Such language is
absent regarding permitted use. He referred to 3.6(a)(1)
and noted that it does not make reference to Chapter 4. He
then referred to Chapter 4 referring to all development
permits applicable and required. He noted that Section 4.6
states the types of applications requiring a site plan, and
they are not requesting any of those types of applications.
His interpretation was that neither a preliminary site plan
nor a site plan would be required for this project. Planner
Deis explained that Chapter 4, Development Application
Procedures of Approval Processes, describes the process
which is followed in order to obtain certain approvals.
Richard Kohler, the project architect and a member of the
Planning Commission said: "I think that some of this about
having the site plan, Dennis is being an attorney.
Practically, in order to get a building permit, we have to
prepare a site plan. All of the objective standards are the
water, fire, all of those things, have to be reviewed in the
7
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building permit process. So, don't split hairs. That's all
I'm saying. Don't split hairs to death about does the site
plan need to be done, because clearly, they get done and
they get approved and they have all of the information that
we would have otherwise. It* s just who reviews them and
approves them. I believe that it's just simply the Staff
and the building permit people. It doesn't go to the
Planning Commission.
Mr. Poole stated that the summary argument he would make is
that the Code is ambiguous. A very detailed sketch plan,
legal descriptions, drawings and all other requirements were
submitted to Staff who could review and determine that the
objective criteria were satisfied for the project.
Mr. Kohler stated that it fulfills all the requirements that
even if—what we did was we went overboard a little bit,
because I' m on the Planning Commission. That1 s why . . .
short circuit the process. We've put in everything that you
would do for preliminary site plan, final site plan,
vegetation map, slope maps, parking studies, literally all
of the information that we would have done, so that there1 s
kind of, in effect, overkill. we' re not trying to, again,
as a practical matter, we' re not trying to short circuit the
information that the County gets. It' s just a process issue
for us. Well, you see, when I have the job, it's a
permitted use that should never come before the Planning
Commission.
Mr. Poole reviewed Section 4.12 which he also felt was
ambiguous, and if he took it literally, he would have to
file a subdivision plat. However, according to the
definition, the applicant is not doing a subdivision. In
the Administrative Guidelines, Section 4.4.3, which
discusses a building permit as use by right, which he
interpreted as being a permitted use. It states that the
Director has an obligation to determine with 10 days of the
application if the application is sufficient. Section
4.2(b)(1) of the Code states that the Director has an
obligation to review and make a recommendation on
applications, and he must notify the applicant within a
certain time frame if there are any deficiencies. He stated
that no deficiencies were noted by Director Dotson other
than his determination that the applicant needed a
preliminary site plan approved. He did not say there were
any deficiencies in the site plan. He contended that the
Director could not deny it because there was nothing wrong
8
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with it, and he just wanted to delay the process by putting
them on the agenda for the Planning Commission and Board of
County Commissioners. He cited a Utah Supreme Court
decision which ruled that various government authorities
charged with responsibility for administrating local zoning
and planning ordinances are under a basic duty to act
reasonably. He stated that, if this is a permitted use by
definition and a Conditional Use Permit is not required, he
asked what the Planning Commission and Board of County
Commissioners would do when they received the application.
There would be nothing for them to sign, and the Director
should have made the decision. He felt that was not
reasonable and was arbitrary and capricious. The exception
for single-family residences makes it more arbitrary and
capricious.
Mr. Shapiro asked for Mr. Poole's definition of "County" in
Section 6.14. Mr. Poole responded that, according to the
definition, it means Summit County, so he interpreted that
as being any authorized officer of the County.
Mr. Kohler stated, as an architect, I' m n o t — I know you guys
are attorneys and you get into this pretty deep. I know
that after the 1992 Code was adopted that on Wolf Mountain,
which is in the same RC zone, that green tennis bubble was
approved as a permitted use and did not go through this
process that' s being proposed for us. So, it certainly
hasn' t been consistent, at least in that, because people
would have come out if that green tennis bubble had gone
through the thing and there would be people coming out to
the meetings. One thing Kevin said earlier, and I have a
problem with it, Kevin said that, in the typical thing, you
can build a single family house on this 4-1/2 acre lot.
That actually is not true. If you look back in the table,
the single-family detached dwelling is a conditional use in
this zone. The hotel use or the lodging use is the
permitted use. Planner Deis responded that, when he said
that, he was not referring to the specific zone in which
they are building.
Chair DeGray opened the public hearing.
Robert Fogg was sworn in. He commented that the application
was submitted last August.
Jim Fogg, one of the owners of the project, stated that all
applicable fees were paid and they went to great lengths to
9
; i J fv v i

Summit County Board of Adjustment
Regular Meeting
May 22, 1997
prepare the application properly, and Mr. Kohler had tried
to keep them on track.
Board Member Shapiro was concerned with Mr. Poole' s
interpretation of Section 6.14 that the Director is Summit
County. The section states that the Director may authorize
it provided that it has been approved by the County. He
viewed that as two separate and distinct decision makers.
Mr. Poole felt the language could be looked at as a
prohibition when a final site plan is necessary. However,
he did not feel that a final site plan was necessary in
their situation. Mr. Shapiro noted that the architect had
stated that the argument is not whether a site plan is
required but who approves the site plan. Assuming that a
final site plan is required, he asked Mr. Poole who would
make that approval under the Code. Mr. Poole believed that,
when it is interpreted as a whole, it has to be the Staff.
If this is interpreted the way the Staff wants it
interpreted, there is no permitted use in the County, and
that is not reasonable.
Board Member Scopes quoted from the Director's letter that
he had denied the request based on requirement in the Code
that all projects, whether permitted or conditional uses,
must receive site plan approval from the Planning Commission
and Board of County Commissioners prior to building permit
issuance. He asked if the applicant thinks the Director
doesn't need to approve it or whether they don't want to
submit the site plan or that they feel that the site plan
has already been approved by Staff? He was unsure what the
specific question is.
Mr. Kohler stated, I guess what I'd say is that, even though
it says that, find in the Code where it says that. I think
it's a process question. The staff has outlined us going
through what is, in effect, a conditional use process, the
same as if we were a conditional use, and we' re, in fact,
not. Therefore, we should not go to the Planning
Commission, or my body, nor before the Board of County
Commissioners. It makes no sense for a permitted use to go
those routes. That' s not just the case in Summit County,
that' s the case in Logan or places I appear before as an
architect. Permitted uses go to some member designated by
the Staff, you work with them, and when you've got it the
way you want it, you just go get the building permits, and
usually it' s called a planning sub-check. You take it into
the building department and they go back to the zoning
10
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people and planning, and you don' t even see the planning
people that might have dealt with it.
Board Member Scopes asked if the project has not yet been
reviewed. Planner Deis explained that it has been reviewed
by the Community Development Director and the Senior
Planner, and they found that the intricacies of the project
would require a site plan review. He explained that the
document presented by Mr, Poole was presented as a sketch
plan. Under the definition of the Code, a sketch plan is
referred to as a sketch preparatory to the preliminary plat
or site plan. Board Member Scopes asked the applicant why
he doesn't just submit the site plan for review.
Mr. Poole showed the Board the application submitted on
March 21 which was denied, and it says final site plan
approval. He felt that Staff should have reviewed the site
plan and approved or denied it. He read from the letter of
denial dated April 15 which stated that the Director had
chosen to consider their application as one for preliminary
site plan approval.
Board Member Perry explained Mr. Poole ! s argument indicates
that a permit would abrogate any process at all other than
that you just submit something to the Director. A director
is hired to make the decisions about what is required when a
project is submitted. He explained that permitted use can
cover a gamut of areas. Permitted use does not mean that
you can come in an do anything you want without following
the processes, and the Director is hired to make the
executive decisions regarding the process required.
Otherwise, there would be no purpose in having a Planning
Commission, a County Commission, or even a Code.
Mr. Poole felt that determination was made when the Code was
adopted and the distinction was made between a permitted and
conditional use. When the County Commission adopted the
Code, they said they wanted to look at conditional uses, but
they did not want to spend their time reviewing permitted
uses, because a permitted use do not have the size, scale,
and intensity of use characteristics which require
individual review. The authority for reviewing compliance
with the requirements is delegated to the Director and the
Staff.
Board Member Scopes explained that the Director has made
that decision that the Director has made the decision that
11
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the application requires site plan approval. Mr. Poole
contended that the Director was wrong in that decision.
Mr. Thomas explained that the statute allows any zoning
decision of a County official to be appealed to the Board of
Adjustment which decides whether or not an error was made.
This appears to be a difference of opinion in the way the
Code is interpreted. Where there is an ambiguity or
uncertainty in a portion of the statute, it is proper to
look at the entire act to discern its meaning and intent.
If it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretation,
the one should be chosen which best harmonizes with the
general purpose. The Board should look at the entire Code,
everything stated by the applicant, and everything stated by
Staff, in terms of harmonizing the provisions to get to the
correct interpretation of the Code. The provisions should
be reconciled in terms of site plan approval and that the
Board Members read Mr. Dotson* s letter as well as all Code
sections cited by both parties. After doing so, a
determination should be made based on all of the
information.
Mr. Poole explained that the rule of common law states that
people can use their land for whatever purpose they desire.
Because of that law, if there is ambiguity in the statute,
the Code should be construed in favor of the property owner.
He claimed that the Code is so muddled that there is no
clear intention relative to this issue.
Board Member Shapiro read the definition of a permitted use,
a building permit stating that it requires an approved final
site plan. Section 6.14(a)(1) states that the Director may
authorize a building permit for a non-residential multifamily dwelling, which is what the applicant is proposing,
provided final site plan has approved by the County. He
interpreted the Code as saying that the Director is one
entity and the County is another thing, which he interprets
as some kind of governing body.
Board Member Perry asked how many items are before the
Planning Commission and if any of them are permitted uses.
Mr. Kohler responded that, no, we have no permitted uses to
my knowledge that have come before the Planning Commission.
None. Most of what comes before us is subdivisions, which
Kevin showed you a couple of examples of. Planner Deis
explained that, in order to go through the subdivision
process, an applicant is required to go through a site plan
12
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review. Mr. Poole is arguing that this is not a
subdivision, but the remainder of the definition states that
a subdivision also includes condominiums, tracts, other
divisions for the purpose of offer, sale, lease. If this is
going to be a lodge, hotel rooms will be leased out. He
felt that Mr. Poole appeared to want to be very specific in
interpreting the Code in some areas, but in other areas he
did not want to be specific. He felt that Mr. Pooled
massaging of the Code does not support his argument since he
does not fully accept all the definitions in the Code. Mr.
Poole quoted from the Code that subdivision includes the
division or development of land, whether by deed, metes and
bounds description, provides testacy lease, all premised
upon the division of land. He maintained that they are not
dividing land. Planner Deis was asked to read the permitted
uses in the RC Zone from the matrix.
Mr. Kohler stated that Wolf Mountain recently, in the RC
Zone, installed two lifts to do transportation through a
permitted use. They didn' t come before the Planning
Commission. Planner Deis explained that was because Wolf
Mountain has an existing master plan, and such minor
improvements may be done by minor permit with an existing
master plan. Mr. Poole asked whether he would have to go
through this process if he wanted to farm 20 acres. Planner
Deis explained that a building permit is not required in
order to farm. It was clarified that a building permit
would be required to build a barn on the farm. Mr. Kohler
stated that, if you were building a barn, you certainly
wouldn' t. You would go directly and get a building permit.
Mr. Thomas explained that the state statute provides special
exceptions for agricultural uses.
Chair DeGray clarified that the development is multi-family,
resort commercial, lodge for overnight stay, and the units
will be rented on a nightly basis. It was confirmed that
they could also be used on a long-term rental basis.
Planner Deis explained that those would be considered leased
units, and it clearly states in the Code that that would be
considered a subdivision.
Mr. Kohler stated that, as a member of the Planning
Commission, I want to say something. And Kevin1 s kind of
off on his own here in my mind. There are some practical
problems that Summit County has to deal with. We1 re trying
to adopt a new Code. This Code does have deficiencies.
These are some of them that we' re talking about. We' ve
13

Summit County Board of Adjustment
Regular Meeting
May 22, 1997
allowed too much in both the community commercial and the RC
zone, and there are permitted uses that we really probably
need to look at more stringently. That* s why we have
proposed a new master plan and a new process, because these
deficiencies exist. I think that when you look at the
backlog, people get on the Planning Commission now, most of
the people coming on there have been in the pipeline for
longer than a year. So, there' s a significant backlog, and
most of them are larger tracts of land which are clearly
conditional uses and some of these that should come before
the Planning Commission. To add and take all of the
permitted uses, which is what this—there's a policy
commitment. You1 re making a major policy decision. I guess
you* re recommending a major policy decision. It* s never
been a public debate, and I know Ron was on the County
Commission when the Ordinance got adopted. I find it hard
to believe that the public or the County Commissioners or
the Staff at the time the Ordinance was adopted thought that
there would be no such thing in Summit County, or that came
out at meetings, as permitted uses that would go through the
process differently than the conditional uses or the
subdivisions. I just find it very hard to believe. I find
also that it would be a very difficult, if you took that
position, the Board of Adjustment or whoever, whatever body
took that position, that would be an untenable position for
the County to maintain in light of all the many hostile
people we have already for lots of other reasons. I think
it adds to the applicant's claims of lack of due process
which we already—that' s probably our most vulnerable thing
in some of the largest projects that we' ve had. Some of
them have been in the process since 1990. I think I'm
speaking not so much as the applicant, but really just a
resident of Summit County, and not trying to make a mess up
here of what we' re doing in zoning, and not trying to make
an interim mess that my body or somebody else will have to
clean up after the fact. I just think we have to be
judicious and equitable in our treatment of landowners and
applicants, and I think the tone of what Kevin and the Staff
are doing is clearly not that.
Board Member Shapiro asked if going through a governing body
wasn't just as much due process as going through the
Director. Mr. Kohler responded, no. What I'm saying is, in
order to interpret the Ordinance, what you1 re doing is
you' re saying there1 s no such thing as a permitted use in
Summit County despite the fact that there1 s a table that has
a distinction between permitted and conditional uses, and
14
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for the Staff to do that increases the backlog and the
pressure in a lot of different ways and doesn' t really serve
the community in the end. The correct probably process is
to put the right things with p* s and the right things with
c' s and get them set straight and the process them more
correctly. But expeditiously, certainly there must be some
things in the resort commercial zone that are permitted
uses. I hope that we' re one of the ones that will remain,
and that seems reasonable to me. If you have a resort, then
you have hotels and lodging as a permitted use. That you
would make single family owner occupied when it* s a
conditional use, that protects the resort. That* s a policy
decision that the Planning Commission, or the Board of
County Commissioners on the Planning Commission1 s
recommendation could and would make. The interpretation the
Staff's trying to make I don't think is supported by the
public sentiment in general, that of the Planning Commission
or the County Commission, nor was it at a prior date when
the Ordinance was adopted. I just don' t believe that.
Planner Deis agreed that there are several projects
currently in the process and are moving slowly, but that is
not because of Staff s interpretation of the Code. It is
because there is a sizable amount of development occurring
in the Snyderville Basin with only three planners and one
planning technician to handle them all. Fie felt the backlog
was not relevant to the decision to be made by the Board.
Mr. Poole felt it was relevant, because reasonable people
would not define a permitted use and expect it to go through
the same process as a conditional use. Planner Deis stated
that is also not reasonable to allow a project to go ahead
just because there is a backlog. Mr. Poole argued that the
reason for having a permitted use is so those bodies don't
have to consider that, so Mr. Deis's interpretation of
adding to the burden is contrary to the general policy of
the Code. There was an intent to create a permitted use,
and if there is no distinction between the two, then
permitted use is written out of the Code.
Board Member Shapiro commented that all permitted uses
require a building permit, and as he traces it through the
Code, it states that a site plan is required for a building
permit.
Chair DeGray stated that he understood why the Director
wanted to exert some control over a project that would
15
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obviously have impacts due to its size. He questioned
whether this type of use in the zone should be a permitted
use. He felt it should probably be a conditional use with
the magnitude and densities that the applicant is asking
for.
Mr. Poole returned to Section 4.6 regarding the site plan,
and stated that if it is taken literally as being required
for any building permit, every one of them would have to be
approved by the Board of County Commissioners.
Chair DeGray closed the public hearing.
Planner Deis stated that it is very clear that one of the
conditions of a permitted use is that no permit shall be
established until the required permits are obtained.
Sections 4.6 and 4.12 both require a final site plan, as
well as a final subdivision plat prior to the issuance of a
building permit. Supreme Court cases have upheld the
reasonableness of a master plan in guiding development. He
explained that the Code, when taken as a whole, is not
ambiguous at all. He stated that the applicant simply did
not obtain the proper approvals, and the Director was within
his rights to not accept it because the applicant did not
have site plan approval.
Mr. Kohler stated that Kevin is making an interpretation
that, if you turn in an application with a final site plan,
before that you would have had to go through a preliminary
site plan.
Chair DeGray stated that the discussion is whether a site
plan at all was required.
Chair DeGray commented that this item could have a
substantial effect on the way the County Staff has been
doing business for the last several years. He stated that
he would entertain a motion to table the item until the next
meeting to give Board Members time to review the material
presented at this meeting.
Mr. Thomas stated that, if the item is tabled, the Board
should receive a copy of the minutes and a copy of the Code
as soon as possible. He cautioned the Board Members not to
discuss the matter with each other prior to the next
meeting. Any necessary Code information will be readily
available from Staff, but the minutes will not be ready
16
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until the end of next week. Mr. Poole stated that the
applicant would rather have a denial than wait. Board
Member Shapiro stated that the Board would not give him a
denial, because the Board is not ready to make a decision.
Planner Deis agreed to send the Board Members a copy of the
entire Code with applicable sections highlighted. Mr. Poole
asked to have access to all the information provided to the
Board.
Board Member Perry made a motion to continue the item
until the next regular meeting on June 19. The motion
was seconded by Board Member Scopes and passed
unanimously, 4 to 0.
Chair DeGray explained that at the next meeting there will
be discussion among the Board, and public input will be kept
to a minimum. The Board was admonished not to discuss the
issue with anyone prior to the next session.
The Regular Meeting of the Summit County Board of Adjustment
adjourned at 9:20 p.m.

Mirrutes Approved
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Department of Community Development
Staff Report to the Summit County Board of Adjustment
(5/22/97 Agenda Item)

Appeal of administrative decision requiring the proposed Red Barn Development to comply with
site plan standards and process as outlined in the Snyderville Basin Development Code
Overview/Background
The applicant, Red Barn Development, L.C. represented by attorney Dennis Poole, has appealed
a decision made by the Director of Community Development regarding the processing
requirements in the Snyderville Basin Development Code for a proposed multi-family/lodge type
development on Highway 224 near Wolf Mountain. The applicant contends that the project does
not need to be reviewed and approved by the Planning Commission and Board of County
Commissioners through the Site Plan approval process, and has requested that Building Permits
be issued for the immediate construction of the multi-family units. The applicant bases this on
the fact that the proposed use is a permitted use within the zoning district. The Director has
denied this request based on the requirement in the Snyderville Basin Development Code that all
projects, whether permitted or conditional uses, must receive Site Plan approvalfromthe
Planning Commission and Board of County Commissioners prior to Building Permit issuance.
Analysis
A Site Plan is a development plan for one or more lots/parcels which shows the existing and
proposed conditions of the property. A Site Plan shows topography, vegetation, drainage,
floodplain, wetlands, waterways, the location of existing and proposed buildings and structures,
drives, parking, walkways, ingress/egress, utilities, landscaping, signs, lighting, etc. Site Plans
are used to illustrate how proposed development, such as the Red Barn project, comply with all
the development code regulations and requirements. Once it has been determined, through a
review procedure, that the Site Plan complies with all development regulations, the plan is
approved and used to guide construction activity on the site.
It has been the interpretation of the Summit County Department of Community Development
since 1993 and the adoption of the Snyderville Basin Development Code, that all projects,
whether permitted or conditional uses, are required to receive Final Site Plan Approval prior to
the issuance of Building Permits. This interpretation is based on the following Code sections:
•Section 4.1 of the Snyderville Basin Development Code states, "No development or
development activity may be undertaken within the [Snyderville Basin] unless all development
permits applicable to the proposed development are issued in accordance with die provisions of
the Code."
•Section 3.6 indicates that permitted uses are subject to the general requirements and applicable
performance standards set forth in the Code, and no permitted uses shall be established until all
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required permits are obtained. The Site Plan process is the mechanism under which these
performance standards are evaluated and the determination is made as to whether or not the
proposed project complies with the Code requirements.
•Section 4.12 states, "Any applicant for a Building Permit shall submit an approved Final Site
Plan, Final Subdivision Plat, and, if applicable, a Conditional Use Permit, Master Preliminary
Plat, Specific Plan or Development Agreement, prior to obtaining issuance of a Building Permit."
•Section 6.14(a)(1) states, "The Director may authorize Building Permits for non-residential and
multi-family dwellings provided that a Final Site Plan has been approved by the County and
Construction Plans have been released by the County Engineer."
•Section 4.6(c) indicates that a Preliminary Site Plan approval is required in order to obtain a
Final Site Plan approval.
The Snyderville Basin Development Code Administrative Guidelines outlines the procedure for
receiving Final Site Plan approval. This procedure includes a review, public hearing and
recommendation on a Preliminary Site Plan from the Planning Commission, a review, public
hearing and decision from the Board of County Commissioners on a Preliminary Site Plan, and
then, based on the preliminary approval, a Final Site Plan approval from the Board of County
Commissioners. See Section 7 attached.
This procedure has been followed on all projects in the Snyderville Basin since 1993. All new
development has been required to submit a Site Plan for review and approval from the Planning
Commission and Board of County Commissioners, whether the proposed use is a permitted use
or a conditional use. Neither the Code nor Administrative Guidelines contemplate a separate or
distinct review process for permitted and conditional uses; they are reviewed under the same
process, with conditional uses requiring some additional findings only.
Recommendation
Staff would recommend, based on the Code sections above, that the Board makes a decision to
uphold the Director's decision in denying the issuance of Building Permits for the Red Bam
Development project until the project is reviewed and approved under the Site Plan approval
process as outlined in the Administrative Guidelines. Without this Site Plan review,
developments could potentially be constructed with no regard to site layout, buffering, setbacks,
environmental constraints, adequacy of infrastructure, etc. The Site Plan review and approval
ensures that all new development complies with Code standards and requirements and the project
does not become a determent to the community.
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40.
Development Agreement - an agreement between the developer and the County pursuant
to Section 4.11 herein.
41.
Development of County Impact or DCI - a proposed development which, because of the
nature of its proposed use, size, or other considerations, as defined in Appendix A, will impact
the entire Snyderville Basin and which therefore requires special review.
42.
Development Order - any action granting, denying, or granting with conditions, an
application for a development permit.
43.
Development Permit - any building permit; conditional use permit; preliminary
subdivision plat; final subdivision plat or other plat approval; preliminary site plan; final site
plan; rezoning; or any other official action of the County or any other state or local government
commission, board, agency, department or official having the effect of permitting the
development of land located within the geographic area subject to the provisions of this Code.
Directional Sign - A sign which serves as a directional guide through or to areas, events,
buildings or structures and contain no advertising copy and is less than six square feet in area
and not over four feet in height.
44.
Director - the Director of the Summit County Department of Community Development
or tesauthorized designee.
Dwelling Unit - One or more persons occupying a premise and living as a single housekeeping
unit as distinguished from a group occupying a boarding house, lodging house or hotel as herein
defined.a building occupied by one (1) or more persons living as a single housekeeping unit as
distinguished from a group occupying a boarding house, lodging house or hotel as herein
defined.
Dwelling. Multi-family - A building or portion thereof designed for occupancy bv three (3^ or
more families in separate dwelling units.
Dwelling. Single-Family - A building designed for occupancy by one (1) family, including
manufactured or modular homes in conformance with the provisions of this Code.
Dwelling. Single-Family Detached - A Single-Family Dwelling consisting of a single detached
building containing one dwelling unit located on a lot containing no other dwelling units.
Dwelling. Two-Family - A building designed for occupancy by two (2) families in separate
DRAFT: FOR DISCUSSION ONLY
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48.
Final Site Plan - the map of a proposed development to be filed after approval by the
BCC and any accompanying material as described in this Code.
49.
Final Subdivision Plat - The map of a subdivision to be recorded after approval by the
BCC and any accompanying material as described in this Code.
Financial Institution - An establishment engaged in the business of lending money and/or
guaranteeing loans.
Financial Services - An establishment primarily engaged in the provision of financial and
banking services. Typical uses include banks, savings and loan institutions, stock and bond
brokers loan and lending activities.
Flood or Flooding - A general and temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of
normally dry land areas from:
1. The overflow of waters: or
2. The unusual and rapid accumulation or runoff of surface waters from any
source.
50.
Floor Area - the sum of the gross horizontal areas of the several stories of the building
measured from the exterior faces of the exterior walls or from the center line of party walls.
Included shall be any basement floor, interior balconies and mezzanines, elevator shafts,, aftdstair wells and enclosed porches. The floor area of accessory uses and of accessory buildings
on the same lot shall be included.
51.
Floor area ratio - the ratio of the total floor area of all stories of all buildings on a site
to the total lot area.
Food Processing - An establishment in which foods, grains, or raw materials are processed or
otherwise prepared for human consumption, including dairy manufacturing, canning and
preserving foods, grain milling, bakery products and beverage manufacturing.
Foot-candle - The illumination shed by one (1) candle on one (I) square foot at a distance of one
m foot.
Fraternal Organization - A group of people formally organized for a common interest, usually
cultural, religious, or entertainment, with regular meetings, rituals, and formal written
membership requirements.
DRAFT: FOR DISCUSSION ONLY
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images. Signs do not include the flag or emblem of any nation, organization of nations, or state
OR merchandise and pictures or models of projects or services incorporated in a window
display, point of purchase advertising displays—such as product dispensers or drive up menu
boards, legal notices required by law, (such as collection containers for charity, self help
programs, and phone booths), lettering painted on or magnetically flush mounted on a motor
vehicle operating in the normal course of business, works of art which in no way identify a
product, or scoreboards located on athletic fields.—Definitions of particular functional,
locational, and structural types of signs may be found in Table 1,
98.
Site Plan - a development plan of one or more lots on which is shown (1) the existing
and proposed conditions of the lot, including but not limited to topography, vegetation, drainage,
flood plains, wetlands and waterways; (2) the location of all existing and proposed buildings,
drives, parking spaces, walkways, means or ingress and egress, drainage facilities, utility
services, landscaping, structures,, and-signs, lighting? ancLscreening devices; (3) the location of
building pads for all residential and non-residential buildings; and (4) andthe location and extent
of all external buffers from surrounding areas.
99.
Sketch Plan - a sketch preparatory to the preliminary plat or site plan (orfinalplat or site
plan in the case of minor subdivisions or conditional use permits) to enable the subdividcr to
save time and expense in reaching general agreement with the BCC as to the form of the plat
and the objectives of the Code.
Ski area - All ski slopes or trails and other places under the control of a ski area operator and
administered as a single enterprise.
Ski Slopes or Trails - Areas designated to be used for the purpose of skiing or for the purpose
of sliding downhill on snow or ice on skis, a toboggan, a sled, a tubef a ski-bob, or any other
device. Such designation shall be set forth on trail maps provided with an application for
development approval and designated by signs indicating same to the skiing public.
Special Event - A nonrepeating occurrence having a duration of no longer than one (1^ thirty
OOVday period specifically called to commemorate, initiate, finalize, advertise, or otherwise
recognize a nonroutine happening. Examples of special events include- grand openings: going
out of business sales: sporting events, concerts, fairs, or any public, charitable, educational or
religious event or function.
100. Specific Plan - a document encompassing a specific geographic area of the County which
is prepared for the purpose of specifically implementing the General Plan by (1) refining the
policies of the General Plan to a specific geographic area; and (2) containing specific
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the Summit County Recorder or set forth herein shall govern.
(d)
Limitation on Uses. Fcrmitted-^Uses shall be limited to those aaes
identified in the Schedule of perflritte^ Uses as a Permitted Use or Conditional
Use. In addition to those uses expressly prohibited within a zoning district, any
use category not expressly permitted Qfrffinditioftal shall be deemed prohibited
unless the applicant:
(1)
Obtains a ruling from the BCC in accordance with the procedures
set forth in Section 3.3(b) of this Code, that the proposed use is
substantially similar to other |%HHfteel Uses listed in the Schedule of
Permitted Uses for the applicable zoning district; or
(2)
Obtains an amendment to the Snyderville Basin General Plan and
this Code in accordance with the procedures and standards set forth in
Section 4,4 of this Code: or
(3)
If the use is listed as non-designated, obtains aft tf^glffiligff
approval for such pursuant to the Designated Development Procedures set
forth in Section 3.8 herein.
3.6

Schedule of Pqrff*;tfaffi Uses and Bulk Regulations by Zoning District.
(a)
Schedule of jterfg&feai Uses.
The Schedule of j^efffl&ed Uses
("Schedule") prescribes the allowable uses within each zoning district. The
purpose of the Schedule of Pennitted Uses is to implement the Land use policies
of the General Plan. Land Use Element. The Permitted Uses. Conditional Uses.
Non-designated Uses, and Prohibited Uses within each zoning district shall be as
prescribed in the Schedule. The Schedule lists zoning district on the horizontal
axis and uses cla3aij5(^6fti on the vertical axis. The intersection of the vertical
and horizontal axes is referred to herein as a "cell". The following rules shall be
used to interpret the Schedule of jPMfifote^ U s e s :
(1)
If the Symbol WP" appears in the cell, the use is permitted subject
to the general requirements for specified uses within the zoning distnct.
this Chapter, and the applicable performance standards set forth in
Chapter 5 of this Code. No permitted use shall be established until all
required permits are obtained including, at a minimum, a fottldtftg
fel^M*
permit.
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accordance with Section 4.6 or a final subdivision plat has been approved
in accordance with Section 4.7, and (3) a building permit has been issued
by the Building Official.
(3)
For developments of county impact or phased development
applications, a specific plan or master preliminary plan shall be approved
in accordance with the procedures of Sections 4.9 and 4.10.
4.6

Site Plan.
(a)
Applicability. The following applications shall be required to obtain site
plan approval prior to filing an application for a building permit:
(1)
Requests for zoning map amendments to mixed use, commercial,
or industrial zoning districts; and
(2)

Requests for conditional use approval.

(b)
Approval Procedure. No site plan shall become effective, nor shall
compliance with the provisions of this Code be determined, until a final site plan
has been approved by the BCC.
(c)

Effect of Site Plan Approval.
(1)

Preliminary Site Plan.
[a]
A preliminary site plan shall not authorize the development
of land. After a preliminary site plan has been approved by the
BCC, the applicant may file a final site plan.
[b]
Effective Period of Preliminary Site Plan Approval. The
approval of a preliminary site plan shall be effective for a period
of one (1) year from the date ofthat the preliminary site plan is
approved by the BCC approval, at the end of which time the
applicant must have submitted a final site plan for approval. If a
final site plan is not submitted for final approval within the one (1)
year period, the preliminary approval shall be null and void, and
the applicant shall be required to submit a new plan for sketch plan
review subject to the then existing zoning restrictions and
subdivision regulations provisions of this Code and the General
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Plan.
(2)

Final Site Plan.
[a]
After a final site plan has been approved by the BCC and
filed in the Office of the Summit County GterkRecorder. and no
subdivision plat is required and no final subdivision plat
application is pending, the applicant may apply for building
permits consistent with the proposed site plan. No building permit
application may be filed with the Building Official until the
Director has certified that such application conforms to the
approved site plan.
£b]
The approval of a final site plan shall be effective for a
period of one (1) year from the date that the final site plan is
approved by the BCC. at the end of which time substantial
construction shall have commenced and shall continue without
interruption, as provided in Section 4.2(T)(3) of this Chapterflyft

frijiffttg pern*}? 3ppfo#ffcft fta$ ,fo%ft ..gpfrffftM a**4 n tefog
revjfiWl ,fry ,&£„ Etoftffr If substantial construction has not
commenced within the one (I) year period, the final approval shall
be null and void, and the applicant shall be required to submit a
new preliminary site plan for sketch plan review subject to the then
existing provisions of this Code and General Plan.
4.7

Subdivision Review.
(a)
Applicability. No subdivision may befiledor recorded in the office of the
County Recorder, and no lots shall be sold within a subdivision, until a
subdivision plat has been approved by the BCC.
(b)

Approval Procedure.
(1)
Generally. No subdivision plat may be approved until a
recommendation has been received by the Commission and the BCC has
rendered its decision approving or approving with conditions the
application for subdivision approval. Applications for subdivision
approval shall apply for and secure approval in accordance with the
following procedures.
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judicial or other discretionary power, including rezoning or the adoption of any
rule or regulation that would affect the proposed subdivision, shall be limited to
a period of five (5) years. The covenant shall also contain a proviso that the
County may, without incurring any liability, engage in action that otherwise
would constitute a breach of the covenant if it makes a determination on the
record that the action is necessary to avoid a substantial risk of injury to public
health, safety and general welfare. The covenant shall contain the additional
proviso that the County may, without incurring any liability, engage in action that
otherwise would constitute a breach of the covenant if the action is required by
federal or state law.
(e)
Third Party Rights. Except as otherwise expressly provided in the
Development Agreement, the Development Agreement shall create no rights
enforceable by any party who/which is not a party to the Development
Agreement.
4.12

Building Permits.
(a)
Applicability. No development shall occur except pursuant to a validly
issued, unexpired and unrevoked building permit.
(b)
Building permit required. Any applicant for a building permit shall submit
an approved final site plan,finalsubdivision plat, and, if applicable, a conditional
use permit, master preliminary plat, specific plan or development agreement prior
to theobtaining issuance of a building permit. The permittee shall proceed only
in accordance with the approved development permit and any approved
conditions, and shall agree by recorded document to convey no portion of the
parcel without first obtaining final approval in accordance with the provisions of
theis Code.

4.13

Certificates of Occupancy.
(a)
Applicability. A certificate of occupancy shall be required before any
structure or premises, or part thereof, hereafter erected, changed, converted,
moved, altered or enlarged wholly or in part, may be used or occupied. No
certificate of occupancy shall be issued permitting the use or occupation of any
such structure or premises unless:
(1)
If a building permit was required, the plans and application
approvcdconstruction pursuant to such permit as reflected in the approved
building have been fully completed and accomplished; or
(2)
If no building permit was required, the use conforms to this Code
and all other applicable statutes, ordinances and regulations, or the use is
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materials, and other information required by the BCC or County
Engineer. The as-builts shall also include a complete set of drawings of
the paving, drainage, water, sanitary sewer, or other public
improvements, showing that the layout of the line and grade of all public
improvements is in accordance with construction plans for the plat or site
plan. Each as-built sheet shall show all changes made in the plans during
construction and on each sheet there will be an as-built stamp bearing the
signature of the County Engineer, and date,
(c)

6.14

The applicant's engineer shall provide to the County two reproducible
drawings afld ft.CAP drawing, fife cqinpafrfrfe jo fo$ CoiKjty^ CAft
system, of each of the utility plan sheets containing the as-built
information. When such requirements have been met, and verified by the
County Engineer and Director, the County, shall thereafter accept the
public improvements for dedication in accordance with the established
procedure as set forth in Section 6.12 hereto. Acceptance of the
development shall mean that the developer has transferred all rights to all
the public improvements to the County for use and maintenance. The
BCC may, at their discretion, accept dedication of a portion of the
required public improvements, provided adequate surety has been given
for the completion of all of the required public improvements.

Issuance of Building Permits and Certificates of Occupancy
la)

g ^ J M ^ . l S K m a S ITOiKMffl Section 5,17(d) of this Code, no building
permit shall be issued for a lot or building site unless all public
improvements as required for any applicable subdivision plat or site plan
have bqen completed, py affi P<Wt Qf ffl .iWPygTftgftf agfiftmfflt 3S P3E
S f f i 8 t l l M l M l l t t l l M » ftS Attested to by the Director and County
Engineer and all applicable service providers.
(1)

The Director may authorize building permits for non-residential
and multi-family dwellings provided that a final site plan has been
approved by the County and construction plans have been released
by the County Engineer.

(2)

The Director may authorize the Building Official to issue
residential building permits for a portion of a subdivision provided
all public improvements have been completed and accepted by the
County Engineer, for that portion of the development, including
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screening for the entire project from adjacent properties and
inconsistent land uses; proposed methods for the mitigation of the
impact of the development on public facilities and services; and
proposed access and financial arrangements to ensure the construction
of on-site infrastructure.

7.

6.2

Major Applications. At least fourteen (14) working days prior to filing a
sketch plan for a major application with the Director, the Director may
require the applicant to notify all affected persons and organizations that a
sketch plan will be filed for the subject property and to make a presentation to
such group or persons if the latter make a request to the Director to arrange
such a meeting. Any such notice shall include a brief description of the
proposed development and shall contain a statement that the sketch plan will be
available at the offices of the Department of Community Development for
public inspection. Alt aggrieved persons shall be entitled to submit written
comments pertaining to the sketch plan.

6.3

The Director or the Applicant may appeal a dispute as to the procedure for
approval or the applicability of any standard set forth in Chapter 5 of the Code
to the BCC in accordance with Section 4.6 herein.

PROCESSING APPLICATIONS FOR SITE PLAN OR SUBDIVISION PLAT
APPROVAL
7.1

Submission. An application for site plan or subdivision approval shall be
submitted to the Director. If a proposed development is required to obtain both
subdivision and site plan review, the applications for subdivision and site plan
review, in the exercise of the Director's discretion, may be processed
concurrently.

7.2

Preliminary Site Plan or Subdivision Applications.
7.2.1

Applicants shall not apply for preliminary site plan or subdivision
approval until the Director or BCC has reviewed any sketch plan
required for the proposed development at a preapplication conference.

7.2.2

After the completion of a report and-recommendation to the
Commission, the Director shall schedule a hearing on the application
before the Commission. The Commission shall conduct the hearing and
submit its recommendation of the BCC. Within five (5) days after the
recommendation of the Commission has been rendered, the Director
should place the application and recommendation of the Commission on
the next available regular agenda of the BCC. After receiving the
recommendation of the Commission, the BCC shall consider the
application at a public hearing and shall render its decision to approve,
deny or conditionally approve the application. One (1) copy of the
preliminary site plan and subdivision plat shall be returned to the

12
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applicant with the date of approval, conditional approval, or
disapproval and the reasons therefore accompanying the application.
7.3

Final major permit.
7.3.1

Following the approval of the preliminary site plan or subdivision plat
the applicant shall file with the Director an application for final
approval. The application for a final site plan or subdivision plat shall
conform to the approved preliminary site plan or subdivision plat and
any conditions attached thereto.

7.3.2

The Director shall submit the final application, any proposed revisions
or amendments submitted thereto by the applicant responding to the
conditions attached to the preliminary application, and any report to
the BCC. The application may be placed on the consent agenda of the
BCC. After the BCC has reviewed the application, the report of the
Director, any recommendations and testimony and exhibits submitted
at the public hearing, the applicant may be advised of any required
changes and/or adaitions. The BCC should approve, approve with
conditions, or disapprove the final application, and one (1) copy of the
proposed final site plan or subdivision plat should be returned to the
developer with the date of approval, conditional approval, or
disapproval and the reasons therefore accompanying the application.

7.3.3

7.3.4

The Director may notify the applicant if the final application is not
consistent with the preliminary application. If the final application
for any phase of a preliminary application is not consistent with the
preliminary application the applicant may:
7.3.3.1

refile the final application in a form which is in
substantial compliance with the preliminary
application; or

7.3.3.2

obtain an approval of such substantial deviation by: (1)
applying for an amendment to the preliminary site plan
or subdivision plat, in which case the procedure for
amendment of the preliminary site plan or subdivision
plat shall be the same as for approval thereof, (2) in the
case of a phased major permit application, amending the
master preliminary plan, and in the case of a
development of county impact, amending the Specific
Plan; or

7.3.3.3

appeal the Director's determination to the BCC.

Submission and Review. Subsequent to the resolution of the BCC, at
least three (3) paper copies of the construction plans, and one (1)
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copy of the original of. the application on tracing cloth, and/or
reproduction mylar, and two (2) copies of the application on sepia
paper and at applicant's cost two (2) copies of the application on paper
shall be submitted to the Director for final review. The BCC may
withhold final approval until a review has indicated that all
requirements of the Code and these guidelines have been met.
7.3.5

Signing and Recordation of Final Site Plan or Subdivision Plat.
7.3.5.1

Improvements.
7.3.5.1.1 When an improvement agreement and security are
required, the Chairman of the BCC may endorse
approval on the final application after the agreement
and security* have been approved by the BCC and all
the conditions of the resolution pertaining to the
final application have been satisfied.

7.3.5.1.2 When installation of improvements is required prior
to recordation of the final application, the Chairman
of the BCC may endorse approval on the final
application after all conditions of the resolution have
been satisfied and all improvements satisfactorily
completed. There should be written evidence that the
required public facilities have been installed in a
manner satisfactory to the County has shown by a
certificate signed by the County Engineer and County
Attorney stating that the necessary dedication of
public lands and improvements has been
accomplished.
CONDITIONAL USE PERMITS
8.1

No conditional use shall be authorized, developed or otherwise carried out
until the applicant has secured a final site plan approved by the BCC.

8.2

Review of conditional uses may occur concurrent with site plan review. After
undertaking such review, the Commission and the BCC may approve the
conditional use as submitted, approve the conditional use with such reasonable
conditions as it may deem necessary to protect the character of the existing
neighborhood and ensure the quality of the proposed development, or deny the
proposed conditional use for reasons specified in writing and communicated to
the applicant. If the proposed conditional use is approved or approved with
conditions, such approval should be communicated to the Director in writing
and any required conditions should be incorporated into the permit.

MASTER

PRELIMINARY

PLANS
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shall be subject to change by reason of any compelling,
countervailing public interest or to changes in state or federal
law.
12.

BUILDING
12.1

12.2

12.3

PERMITS

Submission. An application for a building permit shall be submitted to the
Director on the form provided by the County and shall be accompanied by the
required processing fee. The application shall be accompanied by such
documents, plans, maps or other information as the building inspector may
request, including but not limited to evidence that all requested development
permits have been finally approved by the appropriate decision maker and that
all conditions imposed at the time of such approval have been satisfied. Upon
receipt of an application for a building permit, the building inspector shall
examine the application and ascertain ascertain the exact location of the
property on which the development will occur. The building official shall
obtain a written statement of the street address of the property or, if no street
address exists, a property description in writing, before issuing a building
permit.
Approval Procedure
12.2.1

Development permit required. Any applicant for a building
permit shall submit a minor permit or an approved final site
plan, final subdivision plat, and, if applicable, a conditional use
permit, master preliminary plat, specific plan or development
agreement prior to the issuance of a building permit. The
permittee shall proceed only in accordance with the approved
development permit permit and any approved conditions, and
shall agree by recorded document to convey no portion of the
parcel without first obtaining final approval in accordance with
the provisions of the Code.

12.2.2

Posting of building permit. A copy of the building permit shall
be posted in a conspicuous place on the premises, out of the
weather, and visible throughout the construction period until
completion of all work authorized by the building permit.

Expiration and extension of building permit.
12.3.1

A building permit shall automatically expire and become null
and void if work authorized by such permit is not substantially
commenced within six (6) months from the effective date of the
permit, or if such work, when commenced, is suspended or
abandoned an any time for a period of six (6) months.

12.3.2

Notwithstanding the provision of Section 12.3.1, if the work
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RED BARN DEVELOPMENT, L.C., a Utah
limited liability corporation,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER

Plaintiff,
V

SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate and
politic of the State of Utah,

CASE NO

970300092PR

DATE:

28 OCT 1997

JUDGE:

PAT" B BRIAN

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on a hearing for Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment held October 27, 1997 before the Honorable Pat B Brian, District Court Judge.
Plaintiff Red Barn Development and Defendant Summit County were present and presented
argument in favor of, and in opposition to their respective Motions for Summary Judgment.
Having heard argument, and reviewed and considered the memoranda in support or and in
opposition to the Motions, the Court hereby makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order
FINDINGS OF FACT
1

On March 2 1 , 1997, Plaintiff submitted a Final Site Plan application to the

Summit Count v Department of Community Development

This application did not contain a

preliminary Site Plan, nor was a preliminary Site Plan ever reviewed by the Board of County
1

Commissioners or the Planning Commission
2

On April 15, 1997 Summit County denied the issuance of a Building Permit

to Red Barn, stating that the approval of commercial projects requires preliminary and final site
plan approval by the County Board of Commissioners and the Planning Commission
3

On May 22, 1997 and June 19, 1997, the Summit County Board of

Adjustment heard and weighed evidence, and decided to uphold the denial of a Building Permit to
Red Barn Developments
4

Plaintiff Red Barn sought this Court's review of the Board of Adjustment

decision, and this Court heard argument on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
5

On or about October 17, 1997, this Court entered an Order holding that,

while its review would be limited to the record of the hearing before the County Board of
Adjustments, the Court would review the Board of Adjustment's decision de novo, giving no
deference to the conclusions of law reached by the Board of Adjustments This Court held an
additional hearing on October 27, 1997 to further consider the Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court may grant a Motion for Summary Judgment when there exists no

genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
At the hearing held October 27, 1997, both parties stipulated that there exists no genuine issues o(
matenal fact, and this Court should entei judgment as a mattei of law

2.

The law controlling the case at hand is the Synderville Basin Development

Code (the "Code. 1 ')
3
use building permit

Plaintiff properly seeks a permitted use building permit, and not a conditional
The Code clearly distinguishes between a permitted use building permit and a

conditional use building permit. However, this Court is not convinced that the Code clearly sets
forth all the requirements for obtaining a permitted use building permit.
4.

A reading of sections 3 6 and 3 7 of the Code indicate that while a final site

plan approval is required to obtain a conditional use building peunit, the Code makes no such
requirement for obtaining a permitted use building permit.
5.

Defendant's assertion the other elements of the Code taken together, or in the

alternative, that the intent of the Code gives rise to a requiring a final site plan for a permitted use
building permit is unsupported by the plain language of the Code
6.

Consequently, this Court holds that Plaintiff need not submit a final Site Plan

for the County's review and has complied with the Code's requirements set forth to obtain a
permitted use building permit.
7.

However, granting building permits, an exercise of the zoning and police

powers, is a discretionary' legislative function of local government

Consequently, the doctrines o(

separation of powers renders this Court unable to grant the relief Plaintiff seeks This Court can
hold that Plaintiffs have complied with the Code's requirements for a permitted use building
permit, and note that should the County refuse to issue a building permit due to capricious and
ai bin ai > grounds, Plaintiff might then propeily seek relief in this Court

3

uI

ORDER
Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED,
Plaintiffs relief prayed for is DENIED Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED

DATED this $$

day of

4

V C.//Q

/.-' J-^1997

BY THE COURT

?
•>^^//.-/-_.

PATB BRIAN, JODCiT^"
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RED BARN DEVELOPMENT, L C , a Utah
limited liability company
Plaintiff,
V

ORDER
CASH NO

970300092PR

DATE

17 OCT 1997

JUDGE

PA! B BRIAN

SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate and
politic of the State of Utah,
Defendant

I'his matter came befoie the (Joint on a heating foi plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment

At the hearing, the Court inquired as to its proper standard of leview, and whether

this Court should give any deference to the Board of Adjustment's conclusions or review the
conclusions ilc novo

Having heard argument from counsel for plaintiff and defendant, and having

received and considered plaintiffs Motion, togcthei with memoranda in suppoit of and opposition
to the Motion, the Court hereby makes the following Order

V'V

£'/?«-/

ORDER
This Court will review the Board of Adjustment's consclusions dc novo, and the panics
are instructed to proceed with their case as they see fit

DATliD thisO^V day of f^/fa

T rt t x ' ^ ^ l
BY Till: COURT

1

PAT B BRIAN, JUDGE
\f^W
DIST RIC'I COURT JUDGE \ f e #
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CKRTIFICATK OF SER VI £K
(A
/X -4I hereby certify that on this -£f\ day of (_)C. 7", _ ., '997, I caused to be mailed, first
class postage prepaid, a true copy of the foregoing ORDER to
DENNIS K POOLE
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
4541 SOUTH 700 EAST SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107
ROBERT W ADKINS
DAVID L THOMAS

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
SUMMIT COUNTY COURTHOUSE

PO BOX 128
COALVILLE. UT 84107

DATED this^K-/ day of Q(!_t-

Clerk

,1997

ADDENDUM D
(RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE)

l5o

UTAH HLLLS (JH U V I L K K U t M R - n r ,

with our declared policy that in case of uncertainty, default judgments should be set aside to
allow trial on the merits. Locke v Peterson, 3
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955)
Default judgment and writ of garnishment
were properly set aside where trial court failed
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65,
475 P.2d 1005 (1970).
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action,
promptly objected to date set for trial on the
ground that their counsel had an already
scheduled appearance in another court on t h a t
date, but due to fact t h a t there were no law or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-

iVUlC

xj\>

fusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
T i m e for appeal.
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran
from the date of notice of entry of such . udgment, rather than from the date of judgrient.
Backr.er v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d
124, 288 P 2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Hank
& Trust Co v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)).
Cited m Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (H65),
J P W . Enters.. Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486
(Utah 1979); Katz v Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah
1986)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required fcr
T
- Personam Default Judgment m Utah Gra>am v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L Rev 9:-<7
Am. Jur. 2d. —47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgm^r'^s
* 265 et eeq
C.J-S. — 49 C J.S. Judgments §§ 187 vo 218
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof aa to Lability against defaulting defendant, 8 A L R.3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A L R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
rearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

Opemng default or default judgment cla.med
to have been obtained because of attorney's
rvi R takt. es to time or place of appear i n o
rr:aj. or Tiling of n^ressary papers. 21 A L R 3d
" 2' "
FiiJure to give notice of application for at
thdh judgment where notice is required only
by custom, 28 A.LR.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appehjr at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United Si-ates
under Rule 55<e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A L.R Fed. 190
Key N u m b e r s . — Judgment «= 92 to 134

Rule 56. Summary judgment
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending p a r t y . A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment ir his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and p r o c e e d i n g s t h e r e o n . The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavit?. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutoiy in
character, may be rendered on the issue ofliabihty alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages
(d) C a s e not fully a d j u d i c a t e d o n motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked end a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, sh ill if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and m good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-

Rule 56
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stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Experts.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.
Appeal.
—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Attorney's fees.
Availability of motion
Compliance with rule.
Cross-motions.
Damages.

Discovery.
Disputed facts.
Evidence.
—Facts considered.
- Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Weight of testimony.
Implicit rulings.
Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Contract interpretation.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
—Notice.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
Motion to dismiss.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
•—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Procedural due process.
Purpose.
Scope.
Summary judgment improper.
—Damage to insured vehicle.
—Dispersal of interest
— Findings bv court

